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Stratification of the Legal Profession:
A Debate in Need of a Public Forum
Laurel A. Rigertas*
Abstract
The American legal profession is not meeting the legal needs of the population. Ordinary citizens' demand for legal services continues to rise, but those
services are increasingly unaffordable. Despite increasing demand for legal
services, recent law school graduates struggle to find professional employment
opportunities, particularly ones that can provide salaries to meet their rising
debt obligations. Furthermore, legal education continues to provide a general
program of education while legal practice is increasingly specialized. Meeting
the future legal needs of society will require radical changes in the delivery of
legal services. The legal profession, however, has not been sufficiently innovative about meeting this challenge.
Modem discussions about increasing access to legal services either
focus on increasing access to free or low cost legal services provided by
lawyers or deregulating the legal profession. Another approach, the stratification of the legal profession, has not been adequately explored as a way to
increase access to legal services. Specifically, stratification would involve the
training, education and licensure of professionals-other than lawyers-to
provide some legal services. For example, a one-year program that focused
on housing law could lead to a limited license as a housing advocate. This
might be an effective way for the private marketplace to provide affordable
legal services in areas of high consumer demand while protecting consumers
from incompetent services. The health care field provides an analogy for this
model.
The greatest barrier to exploring the stratification of the legal profession is limited public participation in the debate. The power of the state
judiciaries to define and regulate the scope of the legal profession's monopoly has largely precluded public participation in this debate. Accordingly,
there is insufficient external pressure on the legal profession to reexamine
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Minnesota; B.S. James Madison University. I want to thank Mark Cordes, Marc Falkoff, Jeffrey
Parness, Daniel Reynolds and Jennifer Rosato for their comments and advice. I also want to
thank my research assistants Christina Chojnacki, Bryant Storm and Lindsay Vanek.
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the scope of its monopoly and consider other options. These deficiencies can
be illustrated by comparing the judiciaries' regulation of legal services to the
legislatures' regulation of health care services. This article proposes reforms
to increase public participation in the debate on the scope of the legal profession's monopoly. If the judicial branches do not take the lead in allowing for
public participation and exploring alternative models for the delivery of legal
services, they risk losing all control over the scope of the legal profession's
monopoly.
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"If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou
shalt not rationjustice."
-Judge

Learned Hand'

I. Introduction
The legal profession is not meeting the legal needs of society and it will not
do so without radical changes in the delivery of legal services. Most importantly,
the cost of legal services in the marketplace needs to be driven down. Modem
discussions about increasing access to legal services either focus on increasing
access to free or low cost legal services provided by lawyers or they focus on deregulating the legal profession. Another approach, the licensing of professionalsother than lawyers-to provide legal advice and representation has not been
adequately explored. The exploration of such options, however, will not happen
without greater external pressure on the legal profession to reassess the scope of its
exclusive monopoly. Adequate forums for public participation that could provide
such external pressure do not, however, presently exist in most states because the
judiciaries have the exclusive power to define the scope of the legal profession's
monopoly.
This article argues three main points. First, the American legal profession,
as it is currently structured, cannot meet the legal needs of the population.2
Traditionally the legal profession has responded to the population's unmet
legal needs by encouraging lawyers to provide more pro bono work, supporting
legal aid programs, developing court sponsored self-help resources and expanding access to unbundled legal services. 3 These are all commendable efforts to
increase access to legal services that should be continued, but they have not

1. Legal-Aid.org, http://www.legal-aid.org/enlas/thoushaltnotrationjustice.aspx (last visited
Feb. 20, 2011).
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. See infra Section II.B-D. Unbundled legal services permit lawyers to provide limited representation for a portion of a matter instead of assuming responsibility for an entire legal matter. See,
e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed
consent."). In 1996 an ABA report recommended that the expansion of unbundled legal services
was an important goal to increase access to legal services. AM. BAR Ass'N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS:
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE 11 (1996); see also FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING
LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE To DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE at xv (2000) (concluding
that an "unalterable path toward self-representation" supported the conclusion that the unbundling
of legal services is the best path toward increasing access to the legal system). One practicing lawyer
has predicted that "the problem of unmet legal needs, if not solved by lawyers, 'will be solved by
technology."' William Henderson and Rachel M. Zahorsky, ParadigmShift, A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (July
2011). "The relative high price of legal services creates opportunities for new entrants." Id.
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come close to filling the gap in the delivery of legal services.' There is no reason to
believe they will do so in the future. The profession must acknowledge that more
innovation is needed.
Second, the stratification of the legal profession has not been adequately explored as a way to increase access to legal representation, particularly in judicial
proceedings. The term "stratification" in this article means specifically the licensing of legal professionals to provide legal advice and representation independent
of lawyer supervision, but with less education than a three-year Juris Doctorate.
For example, instead of graduating from a three-year law school with six-figure
student loans, a person could graduate from a twelve- or eighteen-month program
that focused exclusively on an area of high consumer need-such as housing law,
family law or immigration law-with much lower debt. That person would then
receive a limited license to provide legal advice and representation in that specialized area. With less debt, that person might be able to charge fees that are more affordable for low- and middle-income people. Such a model may also be consistent
with the increased specialization of legal practice.' Furthermore, a one-size-fits-all
three-year program of general legal education may not be the best model in today's
world.6 This conversation needs to be developed in the current discussions about
increasing access to legal services.
Third, this article argues that stratification will not be adequately explored
until there is a forum where the public can meaningfully participate in the debate. The state judiciaries have generally claimed the exclusive power to regulate
legal services, which has excluded the legislatures and the public from discussions about the regulation of legal services. Thus, the legal profession has been
shielded from outside voices that can lead to robust debates, the vetting of ideas

4. See infra Section II.A.
5. See THOMAS MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 14-15 (2010) (arguing that lawyers will not be employable in the future unless they have an expertise in an area of substantive law as
well as knowledge of the non-legal aspects of their clients' problems); Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Professionin the United States, How that ProfessionRecently has been Changing,and Its
Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 737, 798 (2008) (predicting that in the long term lawyers
will not exist as a separate occupation; instead there will be many licenses based on specialty fields).
6. Deborah Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 715 (1996) ("As the practice of law becomes
increasingly specialized and distinctions between lawyers and nonlawyers become increasingly
blurred, the current "one size fits all" model of legal education appears more and more anachronistic."). There have been renewed discussions among leaders in legal education about whether three
years of education, as opposed to two years, are necessary to train someone enough to award them
a Juris Doctorate, however, these discussions still focus on a one-size-fits all model of legal education. See David Van Zandt, Reduce Credit Requirements, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2011) (former
Dean of Northwestern University School of Law arguing that the ABA should reduce the number of
credit hours required to graduate from law school) available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfor
debate/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-school/reduce-credit-requirements-for-law-school; see also
MORGAN, supra note 6, at 196-99 (discussing past proposals to reduce law school programs from
three to two years).
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and the creation of innovative solutions.' This lack of public participation has
constrained innovation in the delivery of legal services.! As a result, when faced
with a civil legal problem, a person in the United States has two choices-to retain a lawyer or to handle the legal matter pro se. 9 In theory, and generally speaking in practice, there are no other options because there is no right to counsel in

civil matters."o
This article compares these limited options to the broad spectrum of choices
that consumers have in the health care field where legislatures, through their police
powers, have stratified the health care profession and provided consumers with a

7. Many scholars have discussed the lack of public participation in the regulation of the legal
profession. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A ComparativeAssessment of the Legal Resource Landscapefor Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 154
(2011) (describing the American legal profession as a "politically unaccountable regulator" that
prevents the public from voting "or otherwise express[ing] its views on how the policymaker is executing on policy."); Benjamin Hoorn Barton, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. I 167, 1200
(2003) ("State supreme courts are ... particularly inaccessible to lobbying from the public."); Charles
W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1989-90) (discussing the lack of public participation in the
regulation of the legal profession); Charles W. Wolfram, Barriersto Effective PublicParticipationin
Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 636-41, 646 (1978) (discussing the lack
of public participation in the regulation of the legal profession).
8. See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the power to define the scope of the legal profession's monopoly.
9. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment provides individuals with a constitutional right to represent themselves pro se in criminal proceedings).
Because individuals do not have a right to counsel in civil cases, it follows that they also have the right
to represent themselves pro se in civil actions in order to have access to the courts. See, e.g., Muka v.
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891, 903 (1983) ("The right to represent oneself in both civil and
criminal matters is basic to our system of justice."). Both federal and state legislatures have affirmed
this right by statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1654 (2006) ("In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally. . . ."); N.Y. C.P.LR. 321 (McKinney 2003) ("A
party ... may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by an attorney. . . ."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. d (2000) ("Every jurisdiction recognizes the
right of an individual to proceed 'pro se'. . . ."); ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal
Services, AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 6 (November 2009) available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose-white-paper.
pdf ("The traditional services offered by lawyers combined with the more recent innovations in the
courts result in a dichotomy in many states, however, where people are either represented by a lawyer
or proceed with their matter on a pro se basis, relying on resources other than lawyers.").
10. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers' Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal
Assistance, 41 LAw & Soc. R. 79, 79-80 (2007) (discussing the lack of guaranteed counsel for issues
in civil law). Some limited exceptions to the two options presented are discussed infra Section II.C.
Even in the absence of a right to counsel in civil cases, judges will on rare occasions appoint counsel
in a civil case. See, e.g., Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1235-1236 (D. Neb.
1995) (analyzing the court's inherent power to appoint counsel in a civil case, although declining to
exercise the power under the facts presented).
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wide spectrum of choices." A person with a medical problem can seek help from
individuals with a wide variety of training and skills, as well as a wide range of cost.
Depending on the ailment and the treatment desired, a person can choose to see a
physician, a chiropractor, a podiatrist, a physician's assistant, a nurse practitioner,
a midwife, or an acupuncturist, just to name a few.12 In providing these options,
the legislative process has allowed for the inclusion of all of the stakeholders in the
debate over what services different health care professionals can safely provide to
consumers. This inclusive process has put external pressure on physicians-who
have an economic interest in maintaining the broadest possible monopoly-and
forced them to cede parts of their territory in order to increase access to health care,
lower costs and provide consumers with choices.I
This article argues that there are lessons that the legal profession can learn
from the health care profession's story of stratification, which would not have occurred if physicians were the only voices in the debate. Specifically, this article
concludes with some possible ways to reform the legal profession's stronghold on
the regulation of the delivery of legal services in ways that would allow the public
to participate in assessing the viability of licensing professionals to provide legal
advice and representation, particularly in areas where there is high consumer need
and low availability of affordable legal services.
Part II of this article surveys data regarding access to legal services in civil
matters and discusses the ways that people obtain legal assistance. Part III compares
the history of the medical profession, which relied on legislatures to create licensing requirements for their profession, to the history of the legal profession, which
relied on judiciaries to create licensing requirements for their profession. This section explores how this difference has impacted the development of the professions,
particularly the range of options available to consumers seeking health care services as opposed to consumers seeking legal services. This section argues that the

11. Evidence suggests that this increased spectrum of consumer choices has increased access
to health care services. See infra note 265.
12. For example, in California, the following licenses, among others, are available in the health
care field: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1000-04 (West 2003) (chiropractors); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 2080-99, et seq. (West 2003) (physicians and surgeons); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2505-21
(West 2003); (midwives and nurse-midwives); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2834-37 (West 2003)
(nurse practitioners); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2830-33.6 (West 2003) (clinical nurse specialists);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2940-51 (West 2003) (psychologists); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3500
(West 2003) (physician's assistants); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3610-15 (West 2003) (naturopathic
doctors); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 4935-49. (West 2003) (acupuncturists). Moreover, in the area
of health care, courts have found that consumers can knowingly pursue completely unconventional
and unregulated treatments, which may even result in their death. See, e.g., Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d
1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that patient who knowingly received non-standard and non-FDA
approved cancer treatment assumed the risk of harm thereby barring her estate from any recovery
after she died).
13. See infra Section I.B.
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public's ability to use the legislative forum to challenge the scope of practice for
physicians is an important aspect of ensuring that limits on non-physician activities
are for the protection of the public. The legal profession lacks a comparable forum
where the public can challenge the scope of the legal profession's monopoly.
Part IV proposes that there are lessons that the legal profession can learn from
the health care profession. A key lesson is the necessity of a more inclusive process
to assess the role of lawyers and, accordingly, the role that licensed independent
professionals, such as housing advocates, might be able to play in the provision
of legal services. The best means to accomplish this may vary by jurisdiction due
to different legal histories and political environments. Thus, this sections sets out
several different approaches that could create a more democratic forum to assess
the scope of the legal profession's monopoly and its potential stratification.
II. Access to Legal Services in Civil Matters
A. An Overview of Access to Legal Services
in Civil Matters
Consumers have few options to access legal services for civil matters. A person can try to retain and pay a lawyer in the private marketplace, try to retain a free
or reduced cost lawyer through services such as legal aid and law school clinics,
or try to retain a lawyer who volunteers his or her services pro bono. If a person
cannot retain a lawyer through one of these avenues, then the person will generally
have to handle his or her legal matter pro se.14 A recent American Bar Association
("ABA") report stated that in many courts "pro se is no longer a matter of growth,
but rather a status at a saturated level."'
Some scholars have concluded that "American-style civil legal assistance has
never aspired to ensure universal access." 6 It may be debatable whether this is an
aspiration, but one cannot debate that the U.S. legal profession is not meeting the
civil legal needs of the population. 7 Several comprehensive reports over the past
twenty years confirm this conclusion. The most recent national report, the final

14. The few areas where nonlawyers can provide some assistance are discussed in Section III.C.
15. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, AN ANALYSIS OF
RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 4 (November 2009) availableat http:/
www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose-white-paper.pdf.
16. Sandefur, supra note 10, at 104.
17. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 103 (2004); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO
BoNo IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 1-3, 26-29 (2006); Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice:
Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879, 1884 (1999); Robert A. Katzmann,
The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 2, 20
(2008) (noting that 65% of aliens in immigration court during 2005 were unrepresented); see also
infra Section II.A.
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report of the ABA's 1994 Comprehensive Legal Needs Study ("1994 ABA Report"), assessed the legal needs of low- and moderate-income households.' 8 That
study found that about half of low- and moderate-income families face a legal
problem each year, but no effort is made to resolve a large number of those problems by using the legal system.19 The reasons given for staying away from the
justice system included costs, doubts that it would help, a sense that the problem
was not serious, or a desire to handle matters on their own. 20
More recent reports, while not on a national scale, continue to confirm that
unmet civil legal needs continue at similar, or perhaps greater, numbers than the
1994 ABA Report found. In 2007, the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") published a report on access to justice (the "2007 LSC Report"). 2 1 It surveyed its own
data regarding unmet legal needs, in addition to analyzing nine recent state studies.2 2 It concluded that the 1994 ABA Report may under-represent the current justice gap in America and found that "only a very small percentage of the legal
problems experienced by low-income people (one in five or less) are addressed
with the assistance of either a private or legal aid lawyer." 23
Similarly, a 2005 Illinois study found that low-income residents of Illinois
faced over 1.3 million civil legal problems in 2003.24 The most common areas of
legal needs were consumer issues, housing issues, family law issues, and debt collection issues. 25 The report concluded that low-income households in Illinois had
legal assistance for only one out of every six of these legal problems, which meant

18. AM. BAR Ass'N CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. AND THE PUB., LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL
JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY (1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.
pdf.
19. AM. BAR Ass'N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE at vii
(1996). The foregoing publication is the final report of the findings contained in a 1994 study. AM.
BAR Ass'N CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERV. AND THE PUB., LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A
SURVEY OF AMERICANS: MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf. See also
Legal Services Corporation, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 9 (2007), available at

http://lsc.gov/sites/default/files/1sc/images/justicegap.pdf which analyzes more recent state studies
and suggests that the 1994 ABA study may underrepresent the current level of need.
20. AGENDA FOR ACCESS, supra note 19, at vii.
21. Legal Services Corporation, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA (2007), available at http://www.1sc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
22. Id. at 3, 5-14. LSC issued a 2009 update to this report that included studies from another
seven states, which reaffirmed similar conclusions. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING
THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 13-18 (2009), availableat http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/documenting-the
justice.gap.in.america 2009.pdf.
23. JUSTICE GAP (2007), supra note 19, at 9.
24. LAWYERS TRUST FUND OF ILL. ET AL., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME ILLINOISANS 1 (2005), available at http://www.Itf.org/docs/legal
needs.pdf. Almost 49% of low-income households in Illinois experienced legal problems in 2003. Id.

25. Id. at 1-2.
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that the subject population handled about 1.1 million legal problems without legal
assistance.2 6 The lack of access to the legal system is also increasingly becoming a
middle-class problem.27
The recent economic downturn may be making access to justice even more
elusive. The LSC's 2010 annual report states that "LSC programs have seen dramatic spikes in cases related to the economy: mortgage foreclosure cases up 128
percent; unemployment compensation cases up 80 percent; domestic violence
cases up 9 percent." 2 8 As a result, agencies funded by the LSC had to turn away
over 1 million cases in 2009 due to inadequate resources to service the clients. 29
For low- and middle-income Americans, more often than not their journey into the
legal system is made alone or not made at all.30
B. Option One-Retaining a Lawyer
in the Private Marketplace
Retaining a private lawyer in the marketplace is the predominant way that
people in the United States obtain legal services.3 1 However, despite a large demand for legal services and a substantial supply of attorneys, the supply and demand frequently do not meet in the marketplace due to the cost of legal services.3 2
For low- and middle-income Americans, the cost of obtaining legal assistance in

26. Id.
27. People in the middle class will not qualify for legal aid, but they also cannot afford the high
costs of attorneys. George C. Harris, Derek F. Foman, The Ethics of Middle-ClassAccess to Legal
Services and What We Can Learn From the Medical Profession'sShift to a CorporateParadigm,70
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 790-95 (2001).
28. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 20Io ANNUAL REPORT 2, available at http://www.Isc.
gov/pdfs/LSC-2010-Annual-Report-FINAL.PDF.
29. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, page 24, availableat http://www.
Isc.gov/pdfs/annual-report_2009_35_years-as americaspartner-forequal-justice.pdf. From 2008
to 2009 LSC reported a 63% increase in unemployment cases, a 37% increase in food stamp cases
and a 50% increase in foreclosure cases. Id. at 20.
30. See Rebekah Diller and Emily Savner, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CALL To END
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 1 (2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn.ne
t/7e05061cc505311545_75m6ivw3x.pdf ("Study after study finds that 80 percent of the civil legal
needs of low-income people go unmet.").
31. This appears to be true even for low-income persons. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, AcCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT
3 (October 7, 2011) (stating that evidence suggests that low-income people who seek out legal assistance have most of their contacts with private attorneys in fee-based arrangements rather than

with legal aid or pro bono attorneys) availableat http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/
PursuingLaw s Promise.html.
32. See Editorial, Addressing the Justice Gap, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011) (discussing
the growing justice gap and suggesting that allowing nonlawyers to handle some legal matters would
help address the gap); see also Johnstone, supra note 5, at 739 ("The available supply of [legal service providers] has been even greater than that needed to fill the demand. One important and troublesome exception to this is that the demand from poor persons unable to pay for needed legal services
exceeds the supply.").
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the marketplace has become increasingly prohibitive. Nationwide household income has decreased five percent since 1999.33 In 2010, 46.2 million people fell
below the poverty line-the highest level in fifty-two years.34 While income has
gone down, lawyers' average billing rates increased 7.7 percent in 2007, 4.3 percent in 2008 and 2.5 percent in 2009.35 In 2009 the national average billing rate
for senior partners was $357 an hour and for mid-level associates it was $219 an
hour. 36 Furthermore, as Professor Hadfield has argued, the cost of legal services is
largely determined by a bidding war between commercial interests and individuals
for access to limited resources.37 Because commercial interests have more money,
they tend to prevail and individuals are priced out of the market. 38
In many types of cases the availability of a contingency fee agreement can
provide a means to finance litigation and obtain access to counsel that a person
could not otherwise afford. 39 There are, however, many types of cases where this
type of financing arrangement is not feasible, such as defense work, or where there
is no market for the contingency fee case.
To compound the issues in the marketplace, the cost of legal education has
risen 317 percent in the past twenty years. 40 Law students frequently take out six-

33. Carol Morello, About 44 Million in U.S. Lived Below Poverty Line in 2009, Census Data
Show, THE WASH. PosT (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/09/16/AR2010091602698.html.
34. Sabrina Tavernise, Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on 'Lost Decade.' THE N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13. 2011).
35. Law.com, THE NAT'L L.J. 2009 Law Firm Billing Survey, availableat http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202436068099&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
36. THE NAT'L LAW JOURNAL AND ALM LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEY OF LAW FIRM EcoNOMICS, (2009), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/SLFE-graphics.pdf. This survey was
of 187 firms, most of them with fewer than 150 attorneys. Id. Fees have steadily increased in past
decades. For example, between 1975 and 1985 hourly rates increased about 100%, with the average
hourly rate for a senior partner being $70 an hour in 1975 and $141 an hour in 1985. D. Weston
Darby, Jr., Are You Keeping Up Financially?,71 A.B.A. J. 66 (Dec. 1985).
37. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How Much the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000).
38. Id.
39. Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is it Price
Competitive?, 25 CARDOzo L. REV. 65 (2003); see also Jack Zemlicka, Firms Explore Flat Ratefor
Divorce, Wis. L.J. (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://wislawjournal.com/blog/2010/11/16/firmsexplore-flat-rate-for-divorces/). Obtaining meaningful data about the cost of legal services for ordinary citizens, however, is difficult because studies on legal fees focus on the corporate markets. Hadfield,
supra note 7, at 129-30.
40. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2011).
The average amount borrowed by a student enrolled in a three-year law school program was
$37,637 between the years of 1992-1993 and rose to $77,300 between 1999 and 2000. THE ABA
COMMIssIoN ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT

17 (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/1rapfinalreport.authcheckdam.pdf.
In 2009, the average law school debt was upwards of $100,000. Kathy Kristof, The Great College
DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE
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figure loans and then need to find employment with salaries high enough to repay
those loans.4 1 Such salaries, which at the largest firms have increased eighty-six
percent in the last sixteen years, require increasing legal fees to finance.4 2 In the
absence of more affordable options in the marketplace, rising legal fees will continue to allow commercial interests to dominate the market to the exclusion of
individual consumers, who will increasingly have to rely on government-funded or
subsidized legal services.
The growing number of unemployed lawyers has resulted in some commentators arguing that the legal profession is overcrowded and that legal reforms should
focus on reducing the number of lawyers and, accordingly, reducing the number of
law schools.4 3 Reducing supply, however, would only further increase the cost of
legal services and limit the availability of legal services, particularly to the lower
and middle classes." While it may make sense for private legal employers, such
as large law firms, to view the demand and supply of legal services through the
lens of their clients' current utilization of lawyers, the legal profession as a whole
should assess demand by considering the population's need for legal services. The
profession is not a pure business that should only respond to the economics of
the marketplace; it is also a public service that has an obligation to try to meet the
demand of the entire population.4 5 The profession as a whole needs to drive prices

Hoax, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0202/060.html. Top
schools such as Northwestern University School of Law charge annual tuition of $47,202 (which
does not include housing, living expenses, books, etc.) and with fewer top paying firms hiring and
paying large salaries that an associate can use to pay down debt, the Dean of Northwestern opined,
"It doesn't make sense to go to law school unless you go to a pretty good one." Ameet Sachdev, Law
School Tuition Hikes Spark Talk of Bubble, CHICAGO TRIB., (April 27, 2010).
41. WILLIAM E. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 188 (2007). "Studies find that most law students need to earn around $65,000 a
year to get the upper hand on their debt." David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011). The media has heavily covered the grim employment prospects for recent
law school graduates. See, e.g., id. ("Since 2008, some 15,000 attorney and legal-staff jobs at large
firms have vanished, according to a Northwestern Law study.

. .

. And with corporations scrutiniz-

ing their legal expenses as never before, more entry-level legal work is now outsourced to contract
temporary employees, both in the United States and in countries like India."). The debt from law
school frequently makes it impracticable for new lawyers to take lower paying jobs that provide
services to more segments of the population than those provided by big law firms. See Catherine
Rampell, "At Well-Paying Law Firms,a Low-Paid Corner,"THE N.Y TIMES (May 23, 2011) ("Lower
salaries make it even more difficult for newly minted lawyers to pay off their law school debt.").
42. How MUCH Do LAW FIRMS PAY NEW ASSOCIATES? A 16-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (October,
2011), availableat http://www.nalp.org/new-associate sal-oct2011.
43. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, ABA Tells SenatorIt is No Position to Regulate the Number of Law
Grads, NAT'L L.J. (July 22, 2011) (on-line edition, copy on file with author).
44. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers? An Economic Analysis of the
Justificationsfor Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 441 (2001).
45. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope, Paragraph
[6]: A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact
that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance.
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for legal services down, not up.4 6 A failure to do this will insure that the law will
predominately exist to serve the nation's wealthy individuals and corporations.
A person who cannot afford to pay a lawyer to handle an entire matter might
be able to retain a lawyer for partial assistance through unbundled legal services,
which permits an individual to retain a lawyer for limited services or advice instead
of hiring an attorney to handle an entire matter.47 In 1996 the ABA recommended
the expansion of unbundled legal services as an important goal to increase access
to legal services.4 8 As a result, in 2000 the ABA amended Model Rule 1.2(c) to
allow a lawyer to provide representation limited in its scope.4 9 About forty states
have since adopted rules that explicitly allow unbundled legal services. 0 But the
legal profession has not fully embraced this type of practice, according to the ABA
Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services' 2009 Report:
[L]awyers who provide personal civil legal services frequently do not meet
the needs of pro se litigants. While they offer the full spectrum of legal services, lawyers are often unwilling to separate or unbundle their services and
provide a limited scope of representation to litigants, although they typically
do so when representing business interests and in transactional matters."
C. Option Two--Retaining a Lawyer through Legal Aid
If a person cannot afford to hire an attorney in the private marketplace, a person could seek representation through legal aid. Legal aid, as the term is used in

Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers
cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing
these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.
46. See William Henderson and Rachel M. Zahorsky, ParadigmShift, 97 A.B.A. J. 40,46 (July
2011) ("For most lawyers, survival will depend upon their ability to harness technology to deliver
greater value to clients at a cost that declines-yes, declines-over time.").
47. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the

scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives
informed consent.").
48. AM. BAR Ass'N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE 11
(1996); see also FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING

(concluding that an "unalterable path toward self-representation" supported the conclusion that the unbundling of legal services is the best path toward
increasing access to the legal system).
LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE at xv (2000)

49. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of the rep-

resentation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.").
50. The ABA has summarized Rule 1.2(c) as it is adopted by the states. See AmericanBar.org,
State Adaptation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(c) and 6.5, available at http://www.
americanbar~org/groups/legal-services/delivery-legal-services/resources/pro-se-unbundling-re
source center/court-rules.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
51. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, AN ANALYSIS OF

RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 6 (November 2009), http://www.

abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose-white-paper.pdf.
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this article, includes programs federally funded by the Legal Services Corporation
and programs funded through other sources, including law school clinics." Legal
aid services, however, are perpetually insufficient due to funding limitations. The
LSC, which is the largest provider of civil legal aid, has been inadequately funded
for over two decades.53 The 2007 LSC Report on access to justice concluded that
inadequate resources caused its agencies to turn away fifty percent of persons seeking legal assistance, which amounts to about 1 million cases a year.54 This figure was reconfirmed in the LCS's 2009 report, Documenting the Justice Gap in
America.55 The next largest funding source for civil legal aid programs comes from
Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts, but these funds have been plummeting during
the recent economic downturn,56 while the number of people who have legal needs
has simultaneously increased. 57

52. See Sandefur, supra note 10, at 83-84 (discussing sources of civil legal assistance). The
Legal Services Corporation (hereinafter LSC) is a federally funded nonprofit corporation that provides funding to 136 independent non-profit legal aid programs around the nation. See Legal Services
Corporation, http://www.lsc.gov/about/sc.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) for information about LSC.
53. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1-2, 18
(2007), available at http://www.1sc.gov/justicegap.pdf (discussing inadequate federal funding since
1981); Legal Services Corporation, http://www.lsc.gov/about/isc.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2011)
(stating that it is "the largest provider of civil legal aid for the poor in the nation.").
54. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 5-8 (2007),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf. Also, some of the types of cases that LSC funded
organizations can handle have been circumscribed for political reasons. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, A CALL TO END FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 1-2 (2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/7e0506lcc505311545_75m6ivw3x.pdf; see also Sandefur, supra
note 10, at 104; Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining Justice: The Legal Profession'sRole in Restricting
Access to Legal Representation, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 1039, 1043-1054 (Special Issue 2006).
55. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 9 (2009),
availableat http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/documenting-the-justice-gap-in-america_2009.pdf.
56. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE IMPACT ON THE RECESSION ON THE ABILITY OF THE
POOR AND WORKING POOR TO OBTAIN HELP WITH PRESSING CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS, 2-10 (June 25,
2010), available at (http://brennan.3cdn.net/d77b2cd7a573fd7271_clm6b56y9.pdf

(providing a

state-by-state summary of the massive decline in IOLTA interest since 2007),; Emily Savner, Expand
Legal Services Now, NAT'L L.J. (June 28, 2010) ("In some states, vast IOLTA shortfalls, along with
the state budget cuts, are forcing legal aid programs to close offices, lay off staff and assist fewer
clients.").
57. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE IMPACT ON THE RECESSION ON THE ABILITY
OF THE POOR AND WORKING POOR TO OBTAIN HELP WITH PRESSING CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 11-20
(June 25, 2010) (providing a state-by-state summary of the increased demand for legal services during the nation's economic downturn), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/d77b2cd7a573fd7271

c1m6b56y9.pdf; Emily Savner, Expand Legal Services Now, NAT'L L.J. (June 28, 2010) ("More and
more people are seeking the help of their local legal aid offices, programs are reporting that requests

for assistance are skyrocketing, telephone intake lines are jammed with calls and wait times in their
offices are growing from minutes to hours."). It is somewhat ironic that while there are an increasing

92

JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER

An April 20, 2010 letter from the National Conference of Bar Presidents to
the United States House of Representatives urged Congress to increase funding to
LSC and made the following points:
The justice gap has grown and is likely to continue to grow this year as
our country struggles to emerge from the current economic crisis. At the
same time demand for help has increased, other major sources of funding
for legal aid (including state appropriations, private giving and Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts revenue) are declining or are under severe stress.5 1
The current focus on reducing government spending could result in cuts to LSC
funding in the upcoming years."
The 2007 LSC Report concluded that the nation's capacity to provide civil
legal assistance would need to be increased to five times the current capacity in
order to provide the necessary access to civil legal assistance, which is an increase
LSC cannot accomplish alone.' Similar to the LSC report's conclusions, the 2005
Illinois Report acknowledged that the challenges to remedying the lack of legal
services "are beyond the power of the legal aid system to address on its own."6 1
That report listed a variety of strategies to try to meet these needs, including pro
bono services by attorneys. 62
D. Option Three-Pro Bono Assistance
Many attorneys provide valuable pro bono work to persons of limited financial means; most, however, do not.63 Providing pro bono assistance is considered

number of people with unmet legal needs, there are also an increasing number of lawyers looking
for work. It is a clear market distortion when there is a large demand and a large supply that cannot
meet up because the rates that lawyers charge (frequently to meet their law school debt) are unaffordable to those who need the services. See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Law School Tuition Hikes Spark
Talk of Bubble, CHICAGO TRIB. (April 27, 2010) (discussing increases in law school tuition and the
challenging job market).
58. Letter from the National Conference of Bar Presidents, to the United States House of
Representatives (April 20, 2010) (on file with author), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/abalmigrated/poladv/priorities/legal services/2010apr20_ncbpletter.authcheckdam.
pdf. Funding for LSC increased 0.5% in 2008, 11.3% in 2009 and 7.7% in 2010. LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, FACT BOOK 2010 3 (2010) available at http://www.1sc.gov/1scgov4/LSC_2010_FactBook.pdf.
59. Andrew Ramonas, Legal Services Bracesfor Cuts, NAT'L L. J. (Nov. 15, 2011); see also
Johnstone, supra note 5, at 739.
60. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 4 (2007).
Nationwide there is one attorney providing personal civil legal services per 525 people; but for lowincome people there is one legal aid attorney per 6,861 people. Id. at 16-17.
61. LAWYERS TRUST FUND OF ILL. ET AL., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME ILLINOISANS 5 (2005), available at http://www.Itf.org/docs/legal
needs.pdf.
62. Id. at 5-8.
63. Deborah L. Rhode, Pr Bono in Principleand in Practice,53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413 (2003)
(empirically studying factors that influence whether attorneys take on pro bono work and suggesting
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an ethical and professional obligation of attorneys, but, it is an obligation that
M It is questionable whether the majorhas remained a largely unmet aspiration."
ity of lawyers believe that they have such an ethical or professional responsibility
or, even if they believe it, whether they have the time to provide such services. 65
Despite ethics rules that encourage attorneys to take on pro bono work, such efforts have not resulted in the majority of attorneys providing pro bono assistance.6 6
For example, in 2009 there were 84,777 attorneys registered in Illinois, however,
according to mandatory reporting requirements, only about a third of them27,200-provided pro bono service during the year.67 Furthermore, of the pro bono

changes in education and employment settings that could help the profession realize its aspirations).
On average, attorneys provide 30 minutes a week of pro bono service. However, much of that time is
not actually aid to the indigent, but instead favors for friends and family. Id. at 413, 429-30. Also, their
financial contributions to legal aid organizations are less than 0.1% of their income. Id. at 417. See
also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 1, 18-21 (2006); Leslie C. Levin,
Pro Bono Publico in a Parallel Universe: The Meaning of Pro Bono in Solo and Small Law Firms,
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 699, 710-15 (2009) (discussing data on lawyer participation in pro bono work);
Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Professionand the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 2, 22 (2008) ("less than fifty percent of lawyers undertake pro bono work in a given
year."); Sandefur, supra note 10, at 85, 97 ("18 percent of the lawyers in 40 states, participated in
formally organized pro bono programs serving the civil needs of the poor in 1997."). This article does
not intend to denigrate the pro bono work that individual attorneys have done, which is commendable. The profession, however, can be too self-congratulatory about its pro bono efforts in light of the
volume of unmet legal needs and the amount of pro bono work collectively provided. As a monopoly
charged with providing access to justice, the legal profession should not be satisfied with its performance. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 1-2 (2006) (discussing a pro bono awards ceremony where lavish praise was given for trivial amounts of volunteer
service).
64. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2004) ("Every lawyer has a
professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.") The ABA was unsuccessful
with its efforts in 1983, 1993 and 2001 to have the Model Rules of Profession Conduct require some
amount of pro bono service as a mandatory obligation. Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principleand
in Practice,53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 426 (2003). See also Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession
and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 2, 4 (2008) (contending that
"[a] lawyer's duty to serve those unable to pay is not an act of charity or benevolence alone, but rather
one of professional responsibility, reinforced by the terms under which the state has granted to the
profession effective control of the legal system.").
65. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 31-32 (2006). There is
some evidence that levels of pro bono services tend to ebb and flow with the economy. See Sandefur,
supra note 10, at 86-87.
66. AM. BAR Ass'N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE 26-28
(1996) (noting that "[flewer than one in six private attorneys participate in pro bono programs").
67. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM'N, HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (2009), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2009.pdf. Illinois is one
of seven states that mandate reporting pro bono hours. See AbaNet.org, State Reporting Policies,
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hours performed, only half of them were legal services provided directly to persons
of limited means.68 There is no reason to believe that the volume of pro bono participation will substantially change in the foreseeable future.' Furthermore, even if
every attorney provided fifty hours of pro bono service a year, that would still not
close the justice gap-more would be required.70
E. Option Four-Pro Se Representation
A majority of low-income and many middle-income persons do not have access to affordable legal counsel for their civil legal matters, so if they use the legal
system they do so pro se.' There has been a rise in pro se representation,72 which

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/reporting/pbreporting.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
Other states with mandatory reporting also have a substantial number of attorneys who do not perform pro bono services. For example, in Florida, only 52 percent of attorneys reported that they
provided pro bono services between 2000 and 2006. PRO BONo: LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD I (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/
7FDO55DEE2A2AD84852575270060D32C/$FILE/Pro%2Bono%2Report%20final%20110908.
pdf9OpenElement.
68. ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DIscIPLINARY COMM'N, HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 2oo9 ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (2009), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2009.pdf. The report
states that 27,200 attorneys reported pro bono hours for 2009, totaling approximately 2.2 million
hours. However, the report states that only about 1.1 million of those hours were for legal services
provided directly to people of limited means. Id. at 4. Illinois has a broad definition of reportable
pro bono service, which includes services such as "legal services to charitable, religious, civic, or
community organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes." ILL. S. CT. R.
756(f)(1)(c). See ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM'N, HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE
2oo9 ANNUAL REPORT 3,12 (2009), availableat https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2009.pdf, for a
three-year chart breaking down the types of pro bono services provided.
69. In fact, in Illinois, the percentage has remained constant at around 32-33% of registered
attorneys since Illinois began collecting such data in 2006. The numbers reported annually can be
found in the Illinois Supreme Court's Annual Reports, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/annreport.asp. See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRo BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE
13-18 (2006) (discussing failed efforts to make the performance of pro bono work mandatory); Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a ReasonableResponse to the Lack of Pro
Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879,
1879 (1998-99) ("Pro bono legal service efforts have barely made a dent in the hugely unmet need
for legal representation among the poor.").
70. See Barry, supra note 69, at 1885 (arguing that even if all attorneys provided 50 hours of
pro bono work, "with the unmet need for legal services placed at approximately 9.1 million, it would
be difficult to yield a significant impact. . ."); Hadfield, supra note 7, at 152 (arguing that if every
lawyer provided 100 hours of pro bono service a year that would not begin to address the legal needs
of ordinary households).
71. Supra Section H.A.
72. LAWYERS TRUST FUND OF ILL. ET AL., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME ILLINOISANS 3 (2005), http://www.robparal.com/downloads/legal
needsstudy.pdf; ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, AN ANALYSIS
OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 4-5 (November 2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose-white-paper.pdf. See also DEBORAH
L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 81-82 (2004) (discussing the growth of self representation); Mike
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has been accompanied by an explosion of Internet resources and do-it-yourself
legal materials over the past several decades.73 To assist with the rise in pro se
representation, courts and legal aid programs are trying to help people represent
themselves by providing tools such as self-help centers. These centers have resources such as basic information on legal rights and responsibilities, advice desks
that are staffed by attorneys who can provide limited assistance to pro se parties,
and Internet resources.74 Some courts have also used paralegals to provide information about the basic court processes, assist with filling out the appropriate court
documents and otherwise assist pro se litigants in general informational ways, but
without providing any legal advice. 5
A rationale for providing pro se education has been articulated as follows: "A
better-educated pro se litigant may still fare better if she were represented by counsel, but the alternative-leaving the litigant in total ignorance-is clearly much
worse, for both the litigant and the court."76 As one scholar has argued:
[O]bdurate attachment to paternalistic ideas about protecting the public
from anything but professional assistance is ignoring reality. . . . The

fact that the legal profession has resisted much more than a feel-good
approach to responding to the paucity of legal representation makes
the need for such projects [for alternative service models] all the more
acute.

Stuckey, The Home You Save Couldbe Your Own, MsNBC.COM, Jan, 29, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/28877173/ (discussing the current housing foreclosure crises, which is causing an increasing number of people to represent themselves pro se); Molly McDonough, More Americans Go Pro
Se, Even in Complex Matters, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 25, 2008) (concluding that while many who chose
to proceed pro se are considered low income, this is increasingly becoming a middle class problem) available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/more-americans-go-pro-se-even in_
complex-matters.
73. The market for Internet based self-help legal assistance and do-it-yourself kits is thriving
and consumers are driven by the affordability and necessity of such means. Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protectionor Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L.
REV. 121, 121-123 (2000). The popularity of these alternatives is a sign of the lack of affordable legal
assistance. Id. at 146. See also William Henderson and Rachel M. Zahorsky, ParadigmShift, A.B.A.
J. 40, 46 (July 2011) ("Incomes of ordinary middle-class citizens have stagnated while the relative
price of legal services has risen. Unmet legal needs are on the rise, opening the door for inexpensive,
Web-based legal services providers that essentially offer do-it-yourself kits for many personal or
business legal needs.").
74. LAWYERS TRUST FUND OF ILL. ET AL., THE LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME ILLINOISANS 3 (2005), http://www.tf.org/docslegalneeds.pdf; ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICEs, AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE
LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS

4-5 (November 2009) http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/

delivery/downloads/prose-whitepaper.pdf.

75. Barry, supra note 69, at 1891-92, 1917-18. The line between "information" and "advice"

can, however, be a challenging one to draw. Id. at 1889-90.
76. Id. at 1882.
77. Id. at 1888.
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This idea that "something is better than nothing" has fueled the creation of
pro se resource centers and clinics as an acceptable "something."" But perhaps the
public would like to be offered a little more."
F. Increasing Options for Legal Services
When a substantial portion of the population lacks meaningful access to the
legal system, the rule of law is threatened. 0 As one court noted, "a substantial
disparity in access to legal representation caused by indigency of one of the parties threatens the adversarial system's ability to produce a just and fair result.""
Furthermore, for the population to believe that the legal system exists to help them
determine their rights and obligations, the individuals in that population must have
some sense that they can meaningfully use that system.82 The increasing cost of
attorneys," coupled with the limited availability of free or low cost legal services,8 4
leaves many people with no access to lawyers to help them navigate the legal system, which threatens the rule of law. 5
While legal aid and pro bono services are important and commendable efforts
that provide some people with access to the legal system, the legal profession must
recognize that neither has come close to providing legal representation to all persons in need of access." If legal aid and pro bono services continue to be viewed

78. Id. at 1893 (discussing hopes that pro se litigants could benefit from even limited advice).
79. Cf. Barton, supra note 44, at 448 ("[W]e allow self-representation, but not unlicensed
representation; a sign that unauthorized practice rules are aimed at suppressing competition and not
protecting the public.").
80. See Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principleand in Practice,53 J. LEGAL EDUc. 413,431
(2003); cf.Gillian K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role ofLawyers in Promotingthe Rule
of Law in Emerging Market Democracies,46 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 416-419 (2007); ILLINOIS RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble [6] (2010) ("a lawyer should further the public's understanding of
and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a democracy
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.").
81. Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1228-29 (D. Neb. 1995) (holding
that the court has the inherent power to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent litigant and, in
support of that holding, discussing the funding cuts to the Legal Services Corporation).
82. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BoNo IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE 27-28 (2006).
83. See, e.g., The Going Rate, PARTNER'S REPORT 6 (June 2006) (discussing national average
of a 5% rate increase for all firm sizes from 2005-06).
84. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.

85. See David Pimentel, ConstitutionalConcepts for the Rule of Law: A Vision for the PostMonarchy Judiciary in Nepal, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 298, 329 (2010); Naresh Singh,
Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Making the Law Work for Everyone, 103 AM. Soc'Y INT'L PROC.
147, 147-8 (2010).
86. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. See also LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION,
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 4 (2007) ("Only a very small percentage of the legal
problems experienced by low-income people (one in five or less) are addressed with the assistance of
either a private attorney (pro bono or paid) or a legal aid lawyer.").
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as the panacea to the lack of access to the legal system, then the legal profession
should concede that universal access to the legal system is not even a goal."
Furthermore, the expansion of legal aid and pro bono services rely on government funding, private monetary donations or private donations of pro bono services. Discussions about increasing access to legal services rarely consider how
to decrease prices for legal services in the marketplace. Any consideration of this
topic is usually focused on deregulating the legal profession." In other words,
some argue that the prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law have prevented competition in areas where nonlawyers could be providing legal services
without undue harm to consumers. Increased competition from nonlawyers could
help drive down the prices of legal services. 9
Deregulation may be appropriate for some areas. In many respects, we already have some deregulation and competition from nonlawyers. For example,
tax accountants routinely provide advice about compliance with the tax laws without being licensed to practice law. 90 There are, however, many areas where legal

87. See William J. Dean, The 2000 Survey of Pro Bono Activity by New York Law Firms,
N.Y.L.J. (May 7, 2001). Dean argues that major increased funding for legal services and greater participation by lawyers in pro bono work are essential for the aspiration of "Equal Justice Under Law"
to become a reality. However, the constant refrain for such increases has not resulted in them. Id.
88. See Clifford Winston and Robert W. Crandall, Time to Deregulate the Practiceof Law,
WALL STREET J. (August 21, 2011).
89. The Federal Trade Commission has frequently expressed concerns that prohibiting laypersons for engaging in conduct that does not require specialized legal training-such as conducting real
estate closings, writing advocacy letters, writing amicus curie briefs and serving as mediators-limits
consumer choice and increases the costs of services to consumers. See, e.g., Letter from the staff of
the Fed. Trade Comm'n Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Econ. to
Carl E. Testo, Counsel for the Rules Comm. of the Superior Court of Conn. (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/beN070006.pdf (expressing concerns that a proposed rule to define the
practice of law would be interpreted in an overly broad manner and would have a negative impact on
consumers and competition); Letter from Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n to N. C. State Bar
Ethics Comm. (December 14, 2001), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/be/V020006.shtm (expressing
opposition to recent opinions requiring the presence of an attorney at all real estate closings and
providing empirical data regarding the increased costs to consumers when nonlawyers cannot compete in the area of real estate closings); see also John P. Brown, The Pros and Cons of Competition,
in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 155-157 (Douglas J. Besharov, ed. 1990). Increased competition from nonlawyers may even have an added impact of increasing pro bono services by lawyers.
Sandefur, supra note 10, at 88, 100, 102 (suggesting that greater participation in pro bono programs
may be correlated with the legal profession's perception that it is under threat from other occupations).
90. Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Profession in the United States, How that Profession Recently has been Changing,and Its Future Prospects,26 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 737, 742 (2008).
The marketplace is also pushing the boundaries of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Can Software PracticeLaw? CNN MONEY, June 30, 2011, available
at http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/30/can-software-practice-law/?iid=HPRiver (discussing a recent lawsuit against LegalZoom, which has been in business since 2001, alleging that its
self-help software is illegally practicing law without a license).
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training and education, as well as licensing conferred upon the demonstration of
minimal qualifications, are important aspects of consumer protection, particularly
when a person is acting in a representative capacity on behalf of another in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings. Under our current system, a person acting in a representative capacity usually must be a licensed attorney, which requires three years
of full-time legal education, although there are exceptions, particularly in the area
of administrative proceedings.9 1 There are additional areas in which there is a high
consumer demand for legal services where perhaps someone with less training and
education than a J.D. could competently provide some of those services.9 2
For example, what if someone could be licensed as a housing advocate? Perhaps such an advocate could provide legal advice in residential real estate closings,
evictions, landlord-tenant disputes and foreclosure proceedings-areas of high consumer need-without any supervision by a licensed attorney. A person with a housing advocate license would have to complete an educational program focused on this
specialization. A thirty-credit one-year program could, for example, require courses
in state civil procedure, contracts, property, real estate transactions, professional responsibility, landlord-tenant law, and an intensive practicum or clinical course in
these areas that would focus on developing a market-ready skill set. 93 There could be
an examination focused on these substantive areas and continued education requirements. Where would a member of the public, or even the legal profession, go to advocate for the creation of such a program? How would this impact legal education?
The idea of nonlawyers providing some legal services has been explored more
by academics than it has by lawmakers. 94 Many scholars who have examined the
issue have concluded that there are some legal services that nonlawyers could provide competently.95 Comparative studies with other countries that allow nonlaw-

91. There are a few exceptions to this general proposition as discussed infra Section m.C.
92. See Barton, supra note 44, at 441 ("The current regulation of lawyers aimed at remedying the problem of incompetent practitioners, however, is not calibrated to needy subsections of the
market.").
93. Id. at 458-61 (suggesting a six month program of legal education that focuses on skills).
94. See, e.g., Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-orEven Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 209-212
(1980), Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers
Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV., 1, 22-23 (1989-90), Russell G. Pearce, Revitalizing the
Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn from Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L. J. 907, 921 (2005);
Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutionaland Empirical Analysis of
UnauthorizedPractice Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1981) (33% of respondents believed
that UPL did not pose any harm or threat to the public good).
95. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 15, 87 (2004); Deborah Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 701, 709-13 (1996). Other countries have allowed nonlawyers to perform some
services that only lawyers may provide in the United States. There has been no evidence of consumer harm from these policies. Id. at 89; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 4, cmt. c (2000) (noting that in the few states that have allowed extensive nonlawyer
provision of legal services, there has been no indication of any significant risks to consumers);

STRATIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

99

yers to provide services that could be considered the practice of law further support
this conclusion. 96
Some scholars have suggested that state legislatures limit the scope of lawyers' monopoly by providing some avenues of competition.97 However, there are
systemic impediments to this approach; namely that many state legislatures do
not have the power to authorize nonlawyers to engage in activities considered the
unauthorized practice of law. In the overwhelming majority of states the power to
define the scope of the legal profession's monopoly is the exclusive province of
the judicial branch. Thus, the state legislatures have no scalpel with which to carve
the contours of lawyers' monopoly or to carve out areas where nonlawyers can
compete. 98 For a point of comparison, think about all of the consumer options that
the legislatures have created in the area of health care services. The development
of the many types of licensed professions in the health care field, as opposed to the
lack of any licensed professionals other than J.D.s in the field of legal services, is
a contrast worthy of exploration.
III. A Tale of Two Professions: The Legal
and Medical Professions
Both the legal and medical professions lay claim to being more than businesses or trades seeking to protect the interests of their members. By controlling
entry into their professions and the quality of the services provided, they also

Alan Morrison, Making Competition Work, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 150-155 (Douglas J.
Besharov, ed. 1990); Daniel C.W. Lang, Utilizing Nonlawyer Advocates to Bridge the Justice Gap
in America, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 289, 302-03 (2011); but see Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules
and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance andAccommodation in Litigation,
54 AM. U. L. REv. 1537 (2005); Carl M. Selinger, The Retention of Limitations on the Out-of-Court
Practiceby Independent Paralegals,9 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 879, 881-896 (1996) (discussing potential problems that could result from officially sanctioning nonlawyer practice).
96. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 7, at 136-39 (discussing the use of nonlawyers to provide
legal services in other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands).
97. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, From Park Place to Community Chest: Rethinking Lawyers' Monopoly, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 155, 175-76 (2007) (arguing that state legislatures should
"roll back the legal monopoly that is responsible for the inaccessibility of legal services" and using
the dental industry as a point of comparison).
98. These impediments are described more fully in Section IV infra. See also Lininger, supra
note 97, at 180 (discussing relaxing UPL statutes without discussing that most UPL statutes do
not, and cannot, define the conduct they prohibit so relaxing them will not likely radically change
lawyers' monopoly). Several challenges have been raised to the constitutionality of statutes that
punish undefined conduct, i.e. the unauthorized practice of law, but no challenge has been successful. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 674 So.2d 747, 750-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Wees,
58 P.3d 103, 107-08 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); Iowa Supreme Court Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Sturgeon, 635 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2001); Mont. Supreme Court Comm'n on
Unauthorized Practice of Law v. O'Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 215 (Mont. 2006); State v. Rogers, 705
A.2d 397, 401 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); State v. Hunt, 880 P.2d 96, 99-100 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994); see also LAS Collection Mgmt. v. Pagan, 858 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Mass. 2006) ("Statutes may provide penalties for the unlicensed practice of law, but may not extend the privilege.").
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provide a public service-protecting the population's health or upholding citizens'
legal rights.99 On this basis, both professions claim a right of self-regulation and
protection from market competition.
A salient difference, however, is that the legal profession reinforces its right
to self-regulate and control the scope of its monopoly by asserting constitutional
protection from legislative intervention under the separation of powers doctrine.'"
The medical profession, on the other hand, has had to rely on the state legislatures
to pass acts that created its monopoly and defined its scope of practice. This difference, in large part, has resulted in different developments in the professions. The
field of health care has become stratified, with legislatures creating different types
of licensed professionals who can provide some services with different levels of
training. The legal profession, on the other hand, has no similar counterpart.
A. History of the Legal and Medical Professions
The development of the legal and medical professions has many historical
parallels. Both professions began with no or few standards for education, training and licensure, which allowed unscrupulous practitioners to prey on the public
causing harm to the reputation and integrity of both professions.'O' Both professions created professional associations as a way to organize and promote the integrity and honor of their professions. The American Medical Association ("AMA")
was created in 1847102 and the American Bar Association ("ABA") was created
in 1878.103 The convention that founded the AMA resolved "to institute a National Medical Association for the protection of their [the profession's] interests,
for the maintenance of their honour and respectability, for the advancement of their
knowledge, and the extension of their usefulness."" Similarly, the ABA's initial
constitution stated its object was "to advance the science of jurisprudence, promote
the administration of justice and uniformity of legislation throughout the Union,
uphold the honor or the profession of the law, and encourage cordial intercourse
among the members of the American Bar."' 5

99. See, e.g., MORRIS FISHBEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1847
to 1947 439-40 (1947) (in 1938 the president of AMA said that one of the aims of the medical profession was to protect "the public against medical frauds, falsely labeled foods, drugs and appliances.");
CARLETON B. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANs, LAW, AND ETHIcs 103 (1984) (discussing a medical society in

Boston in the 1730s that "began to proclaim the need to regulate the practice of medicine in the public
interest."). Regarding the legal profession, see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
100. See infra Section III.C.
101. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 498-500 (3d ed. 2005)
(regarding the legal profession); see infra note 106 and accompanying text regarding the medical

profession.
102. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 31.

103. FRIEDMAN, supra note 101, at 495-98 (discussing the organization of the bar in the late
nineteenth century).
104. CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 105.
105. Proceedingsof the FirstMeeting of the American BarAssociation, 1 A.B.A. REPORTs 30
(1878) (Constitution of the American Bar Association).
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After organizing on the national level, both professions sought to improve
their reputation through education, training and licensing requirements that
would curb unauthorized practitioners.10 6 As one description of the AMA's efforts stated:
From the very first the American Medical Association has prosecuted its war
on quackery and more than any other agency in our country can take credit
for the vast improvement that has occurred in the abolition of nostrums,
secret medicines and quackery... .numerous important evils result from the
universal practice of allowing persons almost wholly ignorant to engage in
apothecaries and still greater from the universal traffic in secret medicines. 0
As part of this "war on quackery," the AMA's 1847 Code of Ethics prohibited doctors from consulting with "irregular practitioners," which it defined as those "untrained in anatomy, physiology, pathology, and organic chemistry."'" The AMA's
early resolutions regarding ethics proclaimed that physicians' duties to the public
included "warn[ing] the public against the devices practiced and the false pretensions made by charlatans." 09
Similarly, the ABA made concerted efforts to curb the unauthorized practice
of law, most notably in 1919 when the Conference of the Delegates of State and
Local Bar Associations met at the annual ABA meeting and discussed ways to stop
nonlawyers from performing legal services and then again in the early 1930s when
the ABA formed a Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law." An early
report of the Committee explained, "The practice of law by unauthorized persons

106. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 248 ("The American Medical Association had been organized primarily to raise the standard of medical education."). Medical education was a topic raised
constantly at AMA meetings. Id. at 48-49, 161, 243, 250, 258, 293; see also OLIVER GARCEAU, THE
POLITICAL LIFE OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 14 (1941 reprinted in 1961) (discussing
early medical societies that were "primarily concerned with the elevation of educational standards
and the licensing of qualified practitioners.").
107. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 103 ("[In the middle of the nineteenth century], [tihe American medical profession was in the process of organizing itself partly, if not primarily, to establish its
supremacy over other types of healers and to raise standards of medical education.").
108. CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 112. The Code of 1847 was replaced by the "Principles of
Medical Ethics" in 1902, which did not have such an absolute ban on consultation with "irregular
physicians." Id. at 113. Similarly, since its t937 amendment to the 1908 Canons of Ethics, which
added Canon 47, the ABA has considered it unethical for a lawyer to aid and abet the unauthorized
practice of law. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs 193-94 (1967).
109. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 39-40. The AMA's Journal published a series of articles to
expose charlatans who claimed to have devised cures for a variety of illnesses. Id. at 426. It also

published other articles exposing what it believed to be unqualified medical schools or unproven
treatments, some of which resulted in libel suits against the organization. Id. at 495-533.
110. Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and LitigatingAgainst "Legal Bootleggers"-The Role of
the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts'InherentPowers in the Early Twentieth Century,
46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 94-95 (2009).
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is an evil because it endangers the personal and property rights of the public and
interferes with the proper administration of justice. It is not an evil because it takes
away business from lawyers."II"
Both professions, however, have a financial interest in the monopoly they
eventually achieved.l 2 As part of their efforts to deflect criticism that their professions are more interested in protecting their members' economic turf than
protecting the public, both professions have claimed that their unlicensed competitors actually create more business for them. For example, doctors opined that,
"[p]erhaps the grand hoaxes do cut into the doctor's practice a bit, though many
feel the advantage is in the other direction when a quack leaves a mangled wreckage for the doctor to work on."ll 3 Likewise, a 1931 ABA report stated, "As a matter
of fact, unauthorized and, hence, unskillful practices are more apt than not to create
business for the lawyer."l 14
Both the AMA and the ABA promulgated codes of ethics in order to raise the
standards of their professions and to give a high moral purpose to their endeavors,
which would help legitimize the monopolies that they sought."' In other words,
ethical standards that put the patient or client's interests first are a significant basis
for "special social and economic privileges."' 16 Both professions use the idea of
"professionalism" as a shield from outside critique in many ways. The idea of professionalism has been subject to criticism. As one scholar said regarding the AMA:
The members of this group are doctors, and belong therefore to a profession. Professionalism is a concept freely used to seal off the group from
critical inquiry. It spreads an odor of sanctity. Members of a profession
are assumed to act in certain ways which are beyond criticism or even
beyond the layman's comprehension. "
From the beginning of their professional organization, both professions also
believed deeply in their ability to clean their own house and regulate themselves.

111. Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 56 A.B.A. RE477 (1931); see also Montana Supreme Court Comm'n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
v. O'Neil, 147 P.3d 200, 213 (Mont. 2006) ("the primary reason for prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law is to protect the public from being advised and represented by unqualified persons not
subject to professional regulation.").
112. See, e.g., GARCEAU, supra note 106, at 26 (quoting a description of the AMA as "essentially a business institution, a vested economic interest.").
113. Id. at 171.
114. Report of the Special Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 56 A.B.A. REPORTS 477 (1931).
115. CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 106-07, 111 ("[T]he leaders of the AMA seem to have
thought that wide distribution of the [Ethics Code of 1847] would convince the layman of its selflessness and noble intent.").
116. Id. at 123.
117. GARCEAU, supra note 106, at 5.
PORTs
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The first president of the AMA told its members "that the medical profession
always cleans its own house, that it does not need extraneous assistance in bringing about reform."" Another early AMA president said: "Eschewing politics,
proposing to control medicine alone and seeking no aid from State or Church,
we should become a law unto ourselves, or rather act above all law save the
divine, since it is quite certain that we alone must protect the honor of the medical profession."" 9
In reality, however, the medical profession has had to rely on legislatures and
licensing statutes to regulate entry into the profession.12 0 In comparison, the legal
profession has truly been able to self-regulate by successfully asserting that the
judicial branches have a right to regulate attorneys under the separation of powers
doctrine.121 This difference in the regulation of the professions has played a key
role in one area where the development of the professions has sharply divergedcompetition from other types of licensed professionals.
B. Regulation of Health Care ProfessionalsA Legislative Process
As the medical profession sought to legitimize its field, it sought legislation to bring about licensing requirements.122 However, the lack of scientific understanding in the early stages of the healing professions resulted in competing
schools of thought about what caused disease and what cured the human body.
This resulted in the creation of a variety of early health care professions-botanic
doctors, homeopaths, Eclectics, "regulars," to name a few.123 The AMA, which represented the educated "regular" physicians, opposed other schools of thought and
tried to exclude them from the statutory licensing process.124 However, the regular

118. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 41; see also GARCEAU, supra note 106, at 6 ("[A] profession
is a group whose code of ethics is powerful enough to raise individual conduct about the level which
it would otherwise attain.").
119. CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 111.
120. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102 (1982).
121. See, e.g., Hanson v. Grattan, 115 P. 646, 647 (Kan. 1911) (holding the legislature can prescribe qualifications for the admission and disbarment of attorneys, to which courts have deferred in
order to avoid friction between branches of government); In re Thatcher, 22 Ohio Dec. 116, 1912 WL
849, at * 1, *2-4 (1912) (holding that the general assembly may provide that an attorney found guilty
of moral turpitude shall not be permitted to practice in any court; however, it may not say that any
particular applicant shall practice as an attorney); People ex rel. Wayman v. Chamberlin, 89 N.E. 994,
997 (Ill. 1909) (holding that the power of the court to disbar an attorney is an inherent power that is
independent of any statute on the subject); but see Charles W. Wolfram, Barriersto Effective Public
Participationin Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 630 (1978) (disputing
the rationale that the public should be excluded from participating in lawyer regulation because of
lawyers' superior knowledge).
122. STARR, supra note 120, at 102.
123. Id. at 93-102.
124. Id. at 99-100.
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physicians did not have the political clout to bring about such legislation without
partnering with competing schools of thought, such as the homeopaths and Eclectics.'25 This partnership in the 1870s and 1880s lead to successful lobbying for
licensing requirements, but the price for the regular doctors was the legitimization
of other types of health care professionals in those licensing statutes.'26 Thus, from
its early history, the health care field had several types of licensed professionals.
As one author wrote about the AMA in the 1940s:
The AMA would like to be the sole voice and final arbiter on all matters
touching upon health. It has not in recent times been accorded any such
monopoly. Though it commonly dominates state licensing boards, it does
not itself grant or withhold licenses, and it cannot prevent cults from securing licenses of their own.. . .bills are sometimes passed giving public
position to unorthodox practitioners.12 7
Furthermore, once scientific developments gave legitimacy to medicine, the
evolution of the medical profession quickly created opportunities for support roles
by other subordinate health care professionals.128 For example, once hospitals
gained mainstream acceptance, physicians needed access to their facilities, but
they did not want to become paid employees of hospitals.129 Instead, they wanted
to maintain their professional independence, which left a need for other health
care professionals to staff the hospitals and serve a variety of support roles, such as
laboratory technicians, nurses and anesthetists.13 0
While physicians recognized a role for subordinate health professionals, they
did not condone professional independence for these groups. Instead, the physicians only supported the creation of other health care professionals to the extent
that they functioned under the supervision of physicians.' 3 ' While physicians could
assert this position, they could not prevent other groups of professionals from

125. Id. at 102.
126. Id. However, even these early licensing statutes had minimal requirements to become
licensed. Id. at 104.
127. GARCEAU, supra note 106, at 165-66; see also Francis Helminski, "That Peculiar Science:" Osteopathic Medicine and the Law, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 32, 32 (1984) ("The legal
bounds of osteopathic practice were eventually expanded by the legislatures, who were more sensitive to direct popular pressure than were the courts.").
128. STARR, supra note 120, at 220-21.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 221-22.
131. Id. at 220-22. In fact, Starr writes that this was achieved in part by "the employment in
these auxiliary roles of women who, though professionally trained, would not challenge the authority or economic position of the doctor." Id. at 221. In the early history of the nursing profession
physicians considered the services that nurses delivered to be quite distinct from the services that
physicians delivered, so it does not appear that physicians saw nurses as a threat to their professional
monopoly. See also FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 77-78 (discussing the role of the nurse as taking care
of the sick and providing them aid and comfort).
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contesting the scope of physicians' monopoly and lobbying for licensing laws that
would give them the right to practice independently in areas that could otherwise
be considered the unauthorized practice of medicine. The legislative process provided a forum for all of the interested stakeholders to advocate for their positions.
1. A Case Study-Nurse Practitioners
Nurse practitioners' ("NPs") successful effort to carve out a broader scope of
practice within the healthcare system is an example of how a democratic forumin their case the legislature-can expand consumers' options. NPs are one of
four categories of advanced nurse practitioners; the other three categories being
nurse anesthetists, clinical nurse specialists and nurse midwives.'32 All advanced
nurse practitioners are registered nurses ("RNs") who have completed advanced
education and clinical practice beyond the education that is required for RNs.133
In 2009, advanced nurse practitioners made up about eight percent of the RN

workforce.13 4
While physicians did not initially perceive a threat to their monopoly from
the presence of other health care professionals, such as nurses, membership in
such professions expanded rapidly. This growth lead to the creation of organized
interest groups that were able to challenge the scope of physicians' monopoly
in the legislatures. For example, in the 1900s the AMA made no resistance to
the presence of nurses in the health care field and, in fact, was an advocate
of increased training programs for nurses, particularly during war times.'35 In
1880, "there were only 15,601 nurses; by 1900 the number had increased to
120,000."136
Following the lead of doctors, nurses organized and formed the National
League for Nursing in 1894, which later became the American Nurses Association
("ANA"), to give nurses a collective voice in the legislative and agency rule-making process.' Much like doctors, nurses sought to use legislative acts to eliminate
competition from untrained providers and to increase the power and prestige of
their profession.' 38 Around the turn of the twentieth century, the ANA and other

132. PETER 1. BUERHAUS, ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE NURSING WORKFORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: DATA, TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

3 (2009).

133. Id.

134. Id.
135. FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 77-78, 305-06.
136. Gerald E. Markowitz and David Rosner, Doctors in Crisis: MedicalEducationand Medical Reform During the Progressive Era, 1895-1915 189, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (Ed. Susan
Reverby and David Rosner) (1979). The number of midwives also rose and there were 5,000 osteopaths, 5,000 Christian Scientists, as well as numerous chiropractors and others who the profession
viewed as competition. Id.
137. MATHY D. MEZEY AND DIANE 0. McGIVERN (eds.), NURSES, NURSE PRACTITIONERS:
EVOLUTION TO ADVANCED PRACTICE 268 (1993).
138. Id.
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nurses' organizations lobbied legislatures to legitimize and regulate nurses by
passing registration statutes for the nurses.1 39 The early registration statutes only
allowed the term "registered nurse" to be used by "a person of good character who
had completed an acceptable nursing program and passed a state board examination." 4 0 Registration acts differed from the later nurse practice acts because the
registration acts did not define an exclusive scope of practice for nurses; instead,
they only mandated qualifications if a person was going to use the title "registered
nurse." 4 1 Others could still hold themselves out as "nurses" and provide the same
services without any special qualifications, training, licenses or registration.142
After successfully getting legislatures to pass registration acts in the early 1900s,
the nursing profession next sought to have licensing statutes passed during the mid1900s. The goal of these statutes was to define the scope of practice for nurses and to
restrict the use of the term "nurse," as well as the performance of tasks considered nursing, to those who obtained a license from the state.143 For example, New York passed
the first mandatory licensing act in 1938, which established two levels of nursesregistered professional and practical-and made it illegal for anyone to practice nursing without a license at one of those levels.'" In order to advance the enactment of
similar statutes, the ANA adopted the following model definition of nursing in 1955:
[T]he performance, for compensation, of any act in the observation, care
and counsel of the ill, injured or infirm, or in the maintenance of health
or prevention of illness in others, or in the supervision and teaching of
other personnel, or the administration of medications and treatments prescribed by a licensed physician or dentist, requiring substantial specialized judgment and skill based on knowledge and application of the principles of biological, physical and social science. The foregoing shall not
be deemed to include acts of diagnosis orprescriptionof therapeuticor
corrective measures.145

139. Jane Greenlaw, Sermchief v. Gonzales and the Debate over Advanced Nursing Practice
Legislation, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 30 (1984). In an argument against leaving the contours
of the definition of nursing to the courts, the author argues, "The influence that nurses can have on
a court's decision is minimal, whereas nurses can and do have a significant role in legislation and
agency rule-making. Id. at 31. See also Francis Helminski, "That Peculiar Science:" Osteopathic
Medicine and the Law, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 32, 34 (1984) (discussing courts inclination to
restrict the activities of osteopaths in the early 1900s; the legal creation of the profession took place
in the legislatures despite opposition from organized traditional medicine); MEZEY AND MCGIVERN,
supra note 137, at 268 (discussing the history of the state nurse practice acts).
140. MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at 268.
141. Id.
142. Id. This is similar to the term "paralegal" today; there are no special qualifications, training, licenses or registration required for one to hold him or herself out as a "paralegal."
143. Id. at 268-69.
144. Id. at 269.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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This definition was included in many state laws, however, the inclusion of the last
sentence was a limitation on nurses' scope of practice that later had to be revised
to allow for the evolution of the role of advanced practice nurses.14 6
The nurse practitioner role was formalized in 1965 with the creation of an
educational program at the University of Colorado.147 The role has expanded over
time, but today nurse practitioners are generally defined as "licensed independent
practitioners who practice in ambulatory, acute and long term care as primary
and/or specialty care providers."4 8 They are licensed as registered nurses and
have graduate degrees."'9 The services they provide generally include diagnosing and managing acute episodic and chronic illnesses; ordering, conducting
and interpreting diagnostic and laboratory tests; and prescribing pharmacologic
agents.5 0 Obtaining legislative authority for this scope of practice happened over
several decades and arose from both changes in the population's need for health
care services as well as contemporaneous legislative battles with physicians.
The rise of nurse practitioners was possible, in part, because in the midtwentieth century physicians became increasingly "specialized and the number of
those providing general medical care declined, creating shortages in poor urban and
rural communities.""' Also, the rise of chronic illnesses and an aging population
in the mid-twentieth century changed the skills and knowledge necessary to meet
patient needs.' 52 These circumstances created a gap in access to health care that
needed to be filled. 53 "Growing alienation of patients from their physician providers created an opportunity for educated allies such as nurses to gain knowledge and
the public's permission to apply it."' 5 4 Thus, "the onset of new types of providers,
such as nurse practitioners in the 1960s, provided an opportunity for society to
question more openly how and why certain professional groups, such as physicians,
claimed such vast cultural authority over health care and if, indeed, these claims
remained legitimate and enduring.""'

146. Id. at 269-70.
147. JULIE FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC 5 (2008); MEZEY AND McGIVERN, supra
note 137, at 270-71.
148. American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, Scope of Practice for Nurse Practitioners,
http://aanp.org/NR/rdonlyres/FCA07860-3DA 1-46F9-80E6-E93AO972FBOD/0/201OScopeOfPract
ice.pdf. See also FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 6.
149. MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at 5.
150. Id.
151. FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 3; see also MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at
60-61, 271.
152. FAIRMAN, supranote 147, at 23.
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id. at 24. See also MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at 6 ("Advanced practice
nursing opportunities continue to increase in response to the demand for access to primary care for

increasing numbers of uninsured and underinsured, to medicine's failure to convince physicians to
enter primary care specialties, and to the emerging political leverage of nurses.").
155. FAIRMAN, supranote 147, at 10 (emphasis added).
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In the 1970s the role of the nurse practitioner was still evolving and unclear
both in practice and legally.'5 6 During the 1970s, nurse practitioners began to divide into specialty practice organizations, such as the National Association of Pediatric Nurse Associates and Practitioners. 7 The growth of the nursing profession
"challenged the basic tenets of medical dominance and provided the evidence for
policy makers that different models of patient care were viable."' 8 Legislative efforts to expand nurses' scope of practice and define their professional role were
numerous. For example, in 1973 "a survey of state nurses' associations found that
54 percent anticipated legislation amending current nurse practice acts in that year
alone." 59
Physicians were only open to the idea of joint practice between physicians
and nurses "as long as the traditional power differential remained in place and
physicians controlled clinical practice." 6 0 In other words, physicians were open to
some collaboration between the professions, but they were not going to relinquish
any of their turf voluntarily.' 6 ' However, through the legislative process, they did
end up having to cede some of their territory.
Today, there is a wide range of legislation in the states regarding the scope
of practice for NPs and whether or not they may have an autonomous practice or
must collaborate with a physician.162 What is common among all states, however,
is that the legislatures have enacted Nurse Practice Acts, which define and regulate
the scope of nurse practitioners' practices.163 Thus, there is a legislative forum for
NPs to have a seat at the table to advocate for their profession and to challenge
the scope of physicians' monopoly.'" "Nurse practitioners are part of the constant
change, however subtle, on who has the authority to provide health care at particular times and places."'6

156. Id. at 145.
157. Id. at 158.
158. Id. at 160.
159. Id. at 145. "Forty-eight percent of the fifty state associations surveyed anticipated legislation
amending the medical practice act-46 percent of those changes were to enlarge the physician's delegatory power, and 50 percent were intended to extend the authority of the medical board to regulate other
health personnel such as physician assistants and nurse practitioners through joint promulgation." Id.
160. Id. at 155.
161. Id.at 183.
162. The American Academy of Nurse Practitioners' website provides a state by state guide of
these differences. http://www.aanp.org/AANPCMS2/LegislationPractice/StatePracticeEnvironment/.
163. The American Academy of Nurse Practitioners' website provides a link to the Nurse Practice
Act in every state. http://www.aanp.org/AANPCMS2/LegislationPractice/StatePracticeEnvironment/.
164. In fact, the American Academy of Nurse Practitioners' website has a link to a brochure
called "When Did You Last Talk with Your Legislature?" that gives nurse practitioners pointers on
communicating with legislators and advocating for the profession. Available at http://www.aanp.org/
NR/rdonlyres/8299193D-8F89-4B48-8895-5A6E57205067/0/WhenDidYouLastTalkWithYourLeg
islator4 11.pdf. See also FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 9.
165. FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 7.
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There are many battles that have taken place in legislatures about the role of
nurse practitioners, 66 but one specific example is the NPs' pursuit for prescriptive privileges.' 7 Nurse practitioners' prescriptive authority has been the result
of legislative efforts and battles in every state. Doctors have fought against the
expansion of nurse practitioners' scope of practice by arguing, among other points,
that if nurses wanted to be doctors, i.e. prescribe medicine, then they should go to
medical school.168 Nurses, having access to the legislative forum, have successfully
pushed back against this position.
For example, in 2000 the NPs in Virginia successfully lobbied the legislature
to pass a bill that expanded their scope of practice and allowed some prescriptive
authority. In 2000, thirty-four other states had broader prescriptive authority than
the NPs in Virginia.169 Prescription drugs fall into two broad categories; first, legend drugs, which are not narcotics (such as antibiotics) and narcotics, which are
divided into five schedules.' Virginia's NPs backed a bill in the legislature for
broad prescriptive authority for all types of drugs, but the Medical Society proposed amendments to the bill that would have limited their prescriptive authority
to legend drugs and only one class of narcotics (Schedule V, which contains low
narcotic drugs such as cough medicines with codeine)."'
Nurse practitioners used several tools to advance their position. They met with
a state senator to discuss "the potential benefits such [broad] legislation would
have for increasing access to health care services, particularly in rural and underserved areas."' 72 They also used scientifically based research data to argue the
safety and efficacy of NP practice."' The varied use of NPs around the country
and in different settings had produced a body of studies regarding the quality and
cost-effectiveness of NPs, as well as studies that criticized their quality and costeffectiveness. 7 4 Policymakers could consider all of this data.
In the spring of 2000, the Virginia legislature passed a new law that gave
NPs the legal authority to prescribe legend drugs and controlled schedules III, IV

166. MEZEY AND McGIVERN, supra note 137, at 365-67 (summarizing some of the legislative
gains made by nurses).
167. Nurses have also used their political leverage to lobby for the right to receive direct reimbursement from insurers and government programs, such as Medicaid, as well as for hospital staffing
privileges. Id. at 13.
168. ARLENE W. KEELING, NURSING AND THE PRIVILEGE OF PRESCRIPTION 1893-2000 139
(2007).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 139-40.
172. Id. at 141.
173. Id. at 146.
174. Id. at 146-47, 152-54; MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at 70-76, 343; see also
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING

HEALTH

9 (2010) (discussing the need to continue gathering data to inform changes in nursing practice and
education).
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and V-a compromise between what NPs sought and physicians' sought.' 5 Nurse
practitioners in other jurisdictions have had similar successes. In 2004 there were
115,000 nurse practitioners in the United States. Ninety-six percent of nurse practitioners prescribed medications and sixty-five percent of them were authorized to
write prescriptions for controlled substances and some narcotics.17 6
If physicians were the sole voice in this debate and controlled the debate,
it is almost certain that nurse practitioners would not have the scope of practice
that they have today. A legislative forum in which NPs, consumers and other
interest groups could advocate was a critical component. As one commentator
has written:
In 1990, New Hampshire nurses were successful in "carving out" the
requirement for physician supervision from their prescriptive authority
statute. This scenario, which could be repeated often in the future, is
contingent on electing legislative representatives sympathetic to nursing,
thus creating public demand for nurses to offer these services.17
Moreover, in these legislative forums, policy makers are not simply asking whether
acts, such as prescribing medicine, fall within the definition of the "practice of
medicine." Clearly it does."' Instead, legislatures are asking whether professionals other than physicians can perform some of the same services without harming
consumers and, if so, then authorizing other professionals to perform such services
when they meet certain training, education and licensing standards.
Physicians' stance against a broad scope of practice by nurse practitioners
continues. For example, in 2003 the American Academy of Pediatrics, citing concerns about public safety, published a policy statement that speaks against independent nurse practitioners (even in medically underserved areas), against direct
third-party payments to nurse practitioners and against prescriptive privileges for
nonphysician providers."' The AMA similarly advocates for it members. For example, in 2006 the AMA created a partnership that was focused on defeating leg-

175.
176.
177.

KEELING,

supra note 168, at 154.

FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 6.
CHRISTINE M. SHEEHY AND MARIANNE C. MCCARTHY, ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING:

EMPHASIZING COMMON ROLEs 61(1998).

178. As one writer scholar wrote:
The line [between nursing and medicine] is elusive because it is incapable of definition.
Some acts are legally performed by both physicians and nurses, and thus are both medical and nursing acts, depending upon who is performing them. The area of shared turf is
increasingly steady, frustrating efforts to delineate exclusive definitions of medicine and
nursing.
Jane Greenlaw, Sennchief v. Gonzales and the Debate over Advanced Nursing Practice Legislation,
12 L. MED & HEALTH CARE 30, 30 (1984).

179.

FAIRMAN,

supra note 147, at 183; for a discussion on third party reimbursement for

nurses, see MEZEY AND MCGIVERN, supra note 137, at 322-41.

STRATIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

III

islation proposed in several states that would expand the practice of other health
care providers.8 0 But its position does not go unchallenged. "In response, twentysix other health provider organizations-including those representing nurse practitioners, physical therapists, and psychologists-formed the coalition for patients'
rights."' 8 ' There is a place for all of these stakeholders to participate in the debate
and influence the outcome.
C. Regulation of Lawyers-A Judicial Process
The regulation of lawyers has taken a very different path than the regulation
of health care professionals. While doctors have relied on legislatures to pass laws
that would define the scope of their monopoly and adopt licensing requirements,
lawyers relied on the state supreme courts. The result of this difference is that
the legislative process has been heavily used as a forum to challenge the scope
of physicians' monopoly and explore the role of other health care professionals.
With respect to the legal profession, however, the use of the legislative process to
expand the delivery of legal services has been extremely restricted and frequently
unsuccessful as a matter of state constitutional law.182 The alternative routes to
regulate the delivery of legal services-judicial rulemaking and constitutional
amendments-both have their own limitations regarding public participation and
effectiveness. While one can find some examples of nonlawyer activities being explored through each of these forums, collectively the efforts are weak and limited
when compared to the robust legislative exploration of licensing a wide range of
health care professionals.
Starting around the turn of the twentieth century the state supreme courts asserted that, under the separation of powers doctrine, they had the exclusive power
to regulate the admission, discipline and disbarment of attorneys.' This conclusion put the responsibility on the courts to determine the training and qualifications for those who would be granted a license to practice law.'" It also largely
precluded the legislatures from participating in the regulation of lawyers.' 5

180. FAIRMAN, supra note 147, at 188.
181. Id., see also KEELING, supra note 168, at 146 (discussing the AMA's opposition to legislation that expanded the scope of practice for other health professionals).
182. See, e.g., Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 736 (Wash. 1981) (holding that
legislature lacked the constitutional power to authorize escrow agents to prepare certain legal documents); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (holding that legislature lacked
constitutional power to exempt certain activities by claims adjusters from the definition of the practice of law).
183. Rigertas, supra note 110, at 82-91. Historically this was not always the position of every
state court. See, e.g., In re Miller, 244 P. 376, 380 (Ariz. 1926) ("We are of the opinion that under its
police power the Legislature has the right to say what qualifications a citizen must possess in order to
be permitted to practice law the same that it may determine the requirements for practicing medicine,
dentistry, pharmacy, or any other profession, vocation or calling.").
184. Rigertas, supranote 110, at 89-91.
185. Id. at 89.
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Despite the state supreme court's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation
of lawyers, lawyers interested in curbing the unauthorized practice of law in the
early 1900s tried to lobby state legislatures to enact legislation that would broadly
define the scope of the legal profession's monopoly.'86 These efforts failed and by
the 1930s the legal profession dramatically changed its strategy and began to argue
that the legislatures had no power to define the practice of law; only the courts had
that power."' This was an effective strategy. Starting in the 1930s and 40s, state
supreme courts have held that, under the separation of powers doctrine, they have
the inherent and exclusive power to define what acts constitute the practice of law
and what acts constitute the unauthorized practice of law.'88
Defining the practice of law has been difficult for the courts. Only a few state
supreme courts have adopted a rule that attempts to define the practice of law
and their efforts leave much to be answered.'8 1 In the absence of a supreme court
rule defining the practice of law in the majority of states, the practice of law has

186. Id. at 92-102.
187. Id. at 116-18.
188. Charles W. Wolfram, Barriersto Effective PublicParticipationin Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619, 636-41 (1978); RIGERTAS, supra note 110, at 118-19; see e.g.,

Neal v. Wilson, 873 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Ark. 1994) ("The power to regulate and define the practice of
law is a prerogative of the judicial department as one of the divisions of government."); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of Supreme Court of Colo. v. Employers Unity, Inc., 716 P.2d 460, 463
(Colo. 1986) ("The Colorado Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to define and to regulate the
practice of law."); State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 131 A.2d 646, 656 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1957) ("The power to regulate, control and define the practice of law reposes in the judicial
department.").
189. See, e.g., ALASKA BAR R. 63; ARIz. SUPREME COURT R. 31; ARK. CONTINUING LEGAL
ED. BD. REG. §2.02; CONN. RULES FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT §2-44A; KY SUPREME COURT R.
3.020; UTAH SUPREME COURT R. 1 (2005); VA. SUPREME COURT R., Part 6, §1; WA GEN. R. 24;
WY. SUPREME COURT R. 11.1. In 2002 the ABA attempted to draft a model definition of the practice
of law. Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law-Draft (9/18/02), http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/task forcemodeldefinitionpracticelaw/
modeldefinitiondefinition.html.. Criticism of the efforts came from lawyers who did not think it was
wise to try to define the practice of law, from consumer advocacy groups who thought it would further
harm the 38 million low- and moderate-income households, and from the Federal Trade Commission
and Department of Justice who were concerned about raising costs for consumers and limiting their
competitive choices. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony E. Davis and W. William Hodes to the ABA Task
Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law on behalf of the Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (December 12, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/
cpr/model-def/aprl.authcheckdam.pdf; Comments submitted by Thomas M. Gordon to the ABA
Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law on behalf of HALT (December 20, 2002),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/halt.authcheckdam.pdf;
Letter from R. Hewitt Pate, et al. to the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law on behalf of the FTC and DOJ (December 20, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
comments/200604.htm. The ABA abandoned its efforts to adopt a model definition of the practice of
law. Report to the House of Delegates, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/cpr/
model-def/recomm.authcheckdam.pdf.
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largely been defined in the decisional law on a case-by-case basis.19 0 State courts
struggle with the task of articulating a definition in their case law and acknowledge the difficulty.191 Some courts have veered away from trying to define the
practice of law in any broad sense, but instead only assess the conduct involved
in the specific case before it. As the Supreme Court of Florida explained, "Many
courts have attempted to set forth a broad definition of the practice of law. Being
of the view that such is nigh onto impossible and may injuriously affect the rights
of others not here involved, we will not attempt to do so here."1 92 The courts' may
be correct in concluding that defining the practice of law is almost impossible.
Instead, it may be easier instead to define what acts nonlawyers may perform, instead of trying to define those acts that are within the exclusive scope of lawyers'
monopoly.193

190. A handful of legislatures did adopt definitions of the practice of law in the 1930s and
some of those definitions remain on the books today. RIGERTAS, supra note 110, at 116-17.
191. See, e.g., Creditors' Serv. Corp. v. Cummings, 190 A. 2, 9 (R.I. 1937) ("What constitutes
the practice of law is extremely difficult, if not unwise, to even attempt to define, and so the determination of any issue that presents this question must be left to the facts of each case."); Cowern v.
Nelson, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (Minn. 1940) ("The line between what is and what is not the practice of
law cannot be drawn with precision."); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 87 N.E.2d
773, 776 (Ill. 1949) ("It would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law."); State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla.
1962) ("Many courts have attempted to set forth a broad definition of the practice of law. Being of
the view that such is nigh onto impossible and may injuriously affect the rights of others not here involved, we will not attempt to do so here. Rather we will do so only to the extent required to settle the
issues of this case."); Denver Bar Ass'n v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964)
("There is no wholly satisfactory definition as to what constitutes the practice of law; it is not easy
to give an all-inclusive definition); N.Y. Code Prof. Resp. EC 3-5 (McKinney 2006) ("It is neither
necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes
the practice of law."). Some legal commentators have also agreed. See, e.g., Ralph T. Catterall, The
UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 625 (1933) ("It is impossible to define the practice
of the law."); John G. Jackson, The UnauthorizedPracticeof the Law, 12 NEB. L. BULL. 332, 334
(1933-34) ("[statutes] should not undertake to define the practice of law, such a definition having
been found neither practicable nor advisable, as self-limiting and inviting evasion."); but see Soha F.
Turfler, A Model Definition of the Practiceof Law: If Not Now, When? An Alternative Approach to
Defining the Practiceof Law, 61 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1903 (2004).
192. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962).
193. The health care field has had some definitional problems too, but that has not prevented
the development of a stratified profession. See CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 135-39 (discussing debates about "what is medicine"). For example, in Missouri there was a question about whether the
nursing practice act would authorize "advanced nursing" or whether additional legislation needed to
clarify that those engaged in advanced nursing were not engaged in the practice of medicine. The
Missouri court held that additional legislation was unnecessary because the legislation authorized a
broad scope of practice for nurses. The court declined "to draw that thin and elusive line that separates the practice of medicine and the practice of professional nursing." Jane Greenlaw, Sermchief v.
Gonzales and the Debate over Advanced Nursing PracticeLegislation, 12 L. MED & HEALTH CARE
30, 30 (1984).
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1. Regulation of NonlawyerActivities by State
Supreme Courts
Courts can use their rulemaking powers to carve out areas where nonlawyers
may provide some services that compete with lawyers. The Arizona and Washington Supreme Courts, however, are the only ones that have regulated and authorized
some nonlawyer activities through their rulemaking powers. The limited use of
rulemaking in this manner may be a result of the legal profession's dominance over
the rulemaking process, which will be discussed more fully in Section IV infra.
In 1983 the Washington Supreme Court adopted a rule that created limited
practice officers ("LPOs").194 In Washington, LPOs are nonlawyers who the court
has authorized to "select, prepare and complete legal documents incident to the
closing of real estate and personal property transactions." 95 In order to become
certified, LPOs must be at least eighteen years of age, be of good moral character
and take an examination that satisfies the requirements established by the Limited
Practice Board (the "Board").196 The Board consists of nine members whom the
Supreme Court appoints; at least four of those members must be admitted to the
practice of law in the State of Washington. 197 LPOs have their own Rules of Professional Conduct'" and they have continuing education requirements.199 However,
while LPOs are authorized to select and prepare forms the Board has approved for
certain types of transactions, the rule states that LPOs "cannot give legal advice as
to the manner in which the documents affect the clients." 200
The Arizona Supreme Court has also used its rulemaking powers to authorize some activities by nonlawyers. Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 authorizes
nonlawyers to perform activities such as appearing in a representative capacity
in some administrative proceedings. 201 The Arizona Supreme Court has also created Certified Legal Document Preparers ("LDPs"), who are nonlawyers certified to provide document preparation assistance without the supervision of an

194. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12. See also Robert C. Farrell, Limited Practice
Officers and Admission to PracticeRule 12: Taking or Not?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 735 (2000).
195. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12(a).
196. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12(c).
197. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12(b)(1).
198. Limited Practice Officer Rules of Professional Conduct, available at http://www.wsba.
org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Admissions/Limited-Licenses-and-Special-Programs/Nonlaw
yers-and-Students/Limited-Practice-Officers/.
199. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12(f).
200. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE RULE 12(e)(2)(v). The Washington Supreme Court also
enacted General Rule 24, which defines the practice of law and explicitly carves out some exceptions to the definition, such as acting a legislative lobbyist, Acting as a lay representative authorized

by administrative agencies or tribunals and serving in a neutral capacity as a mediator, arbitrator,
conciliator, or facilitator. WASH. S. CT. GEN. R. 24 (2002). The Washington State Bar Association
proposed this rule to the Supreme Court. 1 WASH. PRAC., METHODS OF PRACTICE § 3:27 (2011 ed.).
201. E.g., ARIZ. SUPREME CT. R. 31(d)(1), (5), (6) and (8) (West 2011).
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attorney.20 2 LDPs must sit for and pass an examination, must be at least eighteen
years old, must be of good moral character and meet some minimal education
requirements.2 03 They also have a Code of Conduct 20 and continuing education
requirements. 2 05 LDPs can prepare and provide legal documents without the supervision of an attorney and they can provide general legal information. 206 They
may not, however, "provide any kind of specific advice, opinion, or recommendation to a consumer about possible legal rights, remedies, defenses, options or
strategies." 2 07 In other words, neither Washington nor Arizona's Supreme Courts
have used their rulemaking powers to create a new category of licensed professionals who could give consumers any legal advice or provide any limited representation. They essentially only authorize the clerical act of filling out forms at
the customers' direction.
2. Regulation of Nonlawyer Activities by State
ConstitutionalAmendment
Arizona provides one example of nonlawyer regulation by constitutional
amendment. The Arizona Constitution was amended in 1962 to allow real estate
brokers and salesmen to prepare deeds, mortgages, leases and contracts for the
sale of realty. 208 Real estate brokers started the campaign to amend the constitution
after a 1961 Arizona Supreme Court decision, which held that real estate brokers'
participation in these activities was the unauthorized practice of law. 209 The Court's
opinion was based on the separation of powers doctrine and the court's inherent
power to regulate the practice of law. 2 10 In response to this opinion, the realtors
started an initiative petition to amend the constitution that was put on the ballot
202. ARIZ. SUPREME CT. R. 31(d)(24) (West 2011) and ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.

§7-

208.
203. ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. §7-208(E)(3)(b).
204. ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. §7-208(J). Procedures for disciplinary proceedings
against certificate holders who fail to comply with their obligations can be found in ARIZ. CODE OF
JUDICIAL ADMIN.

205.
206.
207.
208.

§7-201(H).

ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.

§7-208(L).

ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. §7-208(F)(1).
ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. §7-208(F)(1).
AZ CONsT. §26, reads:

Any person holding a valid license as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman regularly issued by the Arizona State Real Estate Department when acting in such capacity
as broker or salesman for the parties, or agent for one of the parties to a sale, exchange,
or trade, or the renting and leasing of property, shall have the right to draft or fill out and
complete, without charge, any and all instruments incident thereto including, but not limited to, preliminary purchase agreements and earnest money receipts, deeds, mortgages,
leases, assignments, releases, contracts for sale of realty, and bills of sale.
209. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 13 (Ariz. 1961); see also Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practiceof Law in Arizona: A Legal and PoliticalProblem that Won't Go
Away, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 585, 587-88 (2002).

210. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 9 (Ariz. 1961).
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after it was supported by twice the number of signatures needed.2 11 After spirited
campaigns by the bar and the realtors, the voters adopted the constitutional amendment in the 1962 general election.2 12
3. Regulation of Nonlawyer Activities by State Legislatures
As a result of the state supreme courts' power to define the scope of lawyers'
monopoly legislatures, and accordingly the public, have been largely excluded
from debates about what legal services nonlawyers could provide to consumers.
Compared to legislative activity regulating health care services, legislative activity
regulating legal services has been very constrained. In most states, it is likely that a
legislative act that defined the practice of law, particularly in the context of carving
out some activities from the exclusive domain of lawyers' scope of practice, would
face a successful constitutional challenge and be invalidated by the courts.
For example, in 1936 the Louisiana Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute that exempted some activities of insurance claims adjusters from the definition of the practice of law. 2 13 The court explained the legislature's lack of authority
to enact such a statute as follows:
If the courts have the inherent power to prescribe rules and regulations
for those seeking admission to the bar and if the court has the authority
to discipline or disbar members of the legal profession, it follows that the
scope ofpower residing in the judiciary embraces the right to define, by
court rules, or by adjudicationas cases may arise, the acts constituting
the practice of law; for, if it were otherwise, the Legislature could, as it
has attempted to do in this case, nullify and render ineffective the inherent judicial authority, by providing that a certain course of conduct by
laymen is not the practice of law, in the face of previous adjudications
by the court describing and defining the functions of the lawyer in the
pursuit of his profession. 2 14
In 1981 the Supreme Court of Washington reached a similar conclusion in Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, Inc.215 The Washington legislature had enacted the Escrow
Agent Registration Act, which authorized escrow agents and officers to "select, prepare, and complete documents and instruments relating to . .. contracts for sale or

211. Barlow F. Christensen, Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make
Good Neighbors-OrEven Good Sense, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 159, 197 (1980); see also Rose,
supra note 209, at 587-88.
212. Christensen, supra note 211, at 197; see also Rose, supra note 209, at 587-88.
213. Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1936) ("When the Legislature passes
a statute which attempts to define the practice of law, it directly impinges upon the constitutional
grant of power bestowed upon the courts respecting the regulation of the conduct of the members of
the legal profession.").
214. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
215. Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 736 (Wash. 1981).
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purchase of real and personal property." 216 This legislative act was an attempt to reverse a 1978 case in which the Washington Supreme Court held that the preparation
of legal instruments and contracts that create legal rights was the practice of law. 21 7
In the Bennion case, a law firm brought suit against a registered escrow agent
and argued that the agent was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that
the legislation authorizing the escrow agents' activities was unconstitutional. 2 18
The Supreme Court of Washington agreed that the act was unconstitutional and
explained how the legislature had usurped the court's power:
[T]he power to regulate the practice of law is solely within the province
of the judiciary and this court will protect against any improper encroachment on such power by the legislative or executive branches. In passing
[the act], allowing lay persons to practice law, the legislature impermissibly usurped the court's power. Accordingly, [the act] is unconstitutional
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.2 19
In California, however, the legislature has succeeded in authorizing nonlawyer legal document assistants and unlawful detainer assistants to assist with the
preparation of legal documents in a ministerial manner without supervision by a
lawyer.2 2 0 A legal document assistant in California is defined as:
Any person who ... provides, or assists in providing, or offers to provide,
or offers to assist in providing, for compensation, any self-help service to
a member of the public who is representing himself or herself in a legal
matter, or who holds himself or herself out as someone who offers that service or has that authority. This paragraph does not apply to any individual
whose assistance consists merely of secretarial or receptionist services. 221
Legal document assistants and unlawful detainer assistants need to be registered in
the county of their principal place of business and in any county where they provide services.222 They must also be bonded in an amount of $25,000 to $100,000,

216. Id. at 731-32. The preparation of legal documents has frequently been considered the
practice of law by state courts. See, e.g., King v. First Capital Fin. Serv. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1162
(Ill. 2005) ("All parties agree, and we concur, that the [nonlawyer] defendants' preparation of notes
and mortgages in this case constitutes the practice of law."); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 88 N.E.2d
519, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949) ("According to the generally understood definition of the practice of
law in this country, it embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, and . . . the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds. . .
217. Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d. at 732.
218. Id. at 731.
219. Id. at 736.
220. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6400, et seq. (West 2003).
221. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6400(c)(1) (West 2003).
222. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6402 (West 2003). Registration eligibility is defined in CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6402.1 (West 2003).
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depending on the number of assistants in a business.223 However, the act prohibits
such assistants from providing "any kind of advice, explanation, opinion, or recommendation to a consumer about possible legal rights, remedies, defenses, options, selection of forms, or strategies."224
Although the California legislation has never been the subject of a constitutional challenge, at the time of its creation the State Bar did raise questions about
the legislature's authority to act in this area:
The State Bar last year expressed concern that putting paralegals under
the regulatory authority of an executive branch department would pose
constitutional problems. "We note that the practice of law has always
been under the inherent, plenary power of the Supreme Court," former
State Bar General Counsel Diane Yu wrote....
Perhaps no one has challenged the constitutionality of the statute because the legislative history states that the act was intended to codify the holding of a California case, People v. Landlords ProfessionalServices.226 That case held that clerical
services-such as providing forms to a client, filling out forms at the direction of a
client, and filing and serving forms at the direction of a client-did not constitute
the practice of law. 227 Therefore, the legislature was not carving out an area from
lawyers' scope of practice and authorizing nonlawyers to provide services in that
area; it was simply regulating activities that the California courts had already held
was not the practice of law.
State legislatures have been somewhat more active in authorizing nonlawyers
to appear in a representative capacity in administrative proceedings. 228 There is a
split among the state courts regarding the constitutional propriety of these statutes.
Some state courts have invalidated them and some state courts have found them
constitutional, although their rationales differ.
Some courts have upheld such statutes as constitutional by reasoning that a
statute permitting a nonlawyer to represent a person in an administrative proceed223. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6405 (West 2003).
224. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6400(g) (West 2003); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6401.5 ("This chapter does not sanction, authorize, or encourage the practice of law by nonlawyers.").
225. Assembly Votes 42-29 to Approve Bill to Regulate Independent Paralegals,Metropolitan
News Company (Nov. 19, 1998).
226. SB 1418, Senate Floor, 8/25/98.
227. People v. Landlords Prof'1 Servs., 215 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1608 (1989); see also SB 1418,
Senate Floor, 8/25/98.
228. See, e.g., 820 ILCS 405/806 (authorizing nonlawyers to represent claimants before the
Illinois Department of Employment Security); COLo. REv. STAT. §8-74-106(e) (providing that "All
interested parties shall have the right to be present or to be represented by an attorney or other
representative at the hearing" before the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel). See also Eagle Indem.
Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 18 P.2d 341, 342-43 (Cal. 1933) (holding that the Legislature
did have the authority to permit nonlawyers to appear before the Industrial Accident Commission subject to judicial inquiry regarding the propriety and reasonableness of the legislature's act).

STRATIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

119

ing was not authorizing that individual to practice law. For example, the Illinois
legislature passed the Unemployment Insurance Act, which states, in part: "Any
individual or entity in a proceeding before the Director or his representative, or the
Referee or the Board of Review, may be represented by a union or any duly authorized agent."22 9 Dismissing a claim that a representative acting under this statute was
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, an Illinois appellate court held that:
[Tihe statute is not authorizing a "union" or "duly authorized agent" to
engage in the practice of law. The statute instead limits representation to
"any proceeding before the Director or his representative, or the Referee
or the Board of Review." Thus, the representation by a "union or any
duly authorized agent" is limited to administrative hearings and does not
extend to courts of law. 230
Illinois courts have further reasoned that the acts of the nonlawyer representatives
did not including giving legal advice and, therefore, they were not engaged in the

practice of law.2 31
A couple of other state courts have upheld similar statutes by reasoning that
public policy grounds warranted upholding the statute even though the nonlawyers' authorized acts did constitute the practice of law. For example, in Colorado,
a statute authorized nonlawyers to appear in a representative capacity on behalf
of claimants for unemployment benefits.2 3 2 The Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee of the Supreme Court of Colorado ("UPL Committee") petitioned the
court to enjoin nonlawyers from engaging in activities such as preparing and filing
written documents; giving legal advice to the employer and the employer's present
employees; eliciting testimony at the hearing; presenting closing arguments to the
referees and therein quoting specific sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes;

229. 820 ILCS 405/806.
230. Grafner v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 914 N.E.2d 520, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also
Sudzus v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 914 N.E.2d 208, 214-17 (111. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that,
while the General Assembly has no authority to grant laymen the right to practice law, the Unemployment Insurance Act was not granting such a right by allowing nonattomeys to represent claimants in
administrative hearings); Jeffery Parness, "Yes" to Nonlawyers in Illinois Administrative Adjudications, 97 ILL. B.J. 636, 636 (Dec. 2009).
231. Perto v. Board of Review, 654 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that representation
by nonlawyer before the Department of Employment Security did not constitute the practice of law
because no legal advice was given); see also Virginia State Bar Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, Op. 155 (1992), available at http://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/virginia-upl-opinion-155
(advisory opinion stating that a layperson's appearance in front of an administrative agency does not
constitute the practice of law).
232. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of Supreme Court of Colorado v. Employers
Unity, Inc., 716 P.2d 460, 461 (Colo. 1986); see also Gregory T. Stevens, The Proper Scope of Nonlawyer Representationin State Administrative Proceedings:A State Specific BalancingApproach, 43
VAND. L. REv. 245, 267 (1990) (discussing the State Supreme Court of Arizona's holding that nonlawyers could provide limited representation in administrative hearings on public policy grounds).
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and, in short, making a record of the proceedings on the claim. The UPL Committee's petition also argued that the statute authorizing these activities was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted nonlawyers to practice law. 2 33
The Colorado Supreme Court found that the activities of the nonlawyers did
constitute the practice of law, but it did not enjoin the nonlawyers from continuing
to do so and it did not hold that the statute was unconstitutional. 23 4 First the court
concluded that "the General Assembly does not have the constitutional authority to
determine who can practice law before administrative agencies. 235 The court then reasoned that, exercising its own authority to regulate the practice of law, it would not
hold the statute unconstitutional because it "conforms to the judiciary's authority to
regulate the practice of law."2 36 The court explained that, as a matter of public policy,
these nonlawyer services were economical and were of no proven harm to consumers:
Lay representation in this field has been accepted by the public for 50
years. It poses no threat to the People of the State of Colorado. Nor is
it interfering with the proper administration of justice. No evidence was
presented to the contrary.
In general, the amounts involved do not warrant the employment of an attorney. The average weekly benefit in 1983 was $148.20. Because many
claimants are reemployed before their 26-week eligibility period expires,
it is impossible to predict with any certainty what the aggregate amount
of benefits received by a claimant will be. Lay representation has proven
cost effective.
As a matter of public policy, the benefits of the present system of lay
representation serve the best interests of the public.237
A few courts, however, have held that these types of legislative acts encroach on
the judicial branch's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law and, accordingly, they have held that the statutes were unconstitutional. 238

233. Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of Supreme Court of Colorado v. Employers
Unity, Inc., 716 P.2d at 461.
234. Id. at 463.
235. Id.

236. Id. at 463-64.
237. Id. at 463; see also Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm'n, 619
P.2d 1036, 1038-39 (Ariz. 1980) (adopting, in part, legislation that authorized lay representation in
administrative proceedings based on the public interest).
238. See, e.g., Turner v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 980 S.W.2d 560, 563 (1998) (holding unconstitutional a statute that authorized non-attorneys to act as legal representatives in proceedings
before the Department of Workers' Claims); Washington Attorney AGO 61-62 No. 6 (1961) (advisory opinion stating that "[a]ppearance by non-attorney in a representative capacity before a
state administrative agency in a "contested case" constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Whether an appearance in other administrative proceedings constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law depends upon facts of each case and requirements of protection of the public interest.").
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It is also worth noting that federal courts and agencies have asserted that they
have the right to determine who will appear before them and neither the state courts
nor legislatures can invalidate this power.239 The United States Code also allows
federal agencies to determine whether nonlawyers may appear in administrative
proceedings in a representative capacity. 2'0 Accordingly, the executive and legislative branches of the federal government have authorized nonlawyers to perform
services that could otherwise be considered the practice of law. For example, §110
of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes nonlawyers to prepare bankruptcy petitions for
a fee. 241 Federal statutes and regulations also authorize nonlawyers to appear in a
representative capacity in many types of administrative proceedings; for example,
proceedings before the Internal Revenue Service, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, and patent prosecutions before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. 24 2 The Department of Homeland Security has also authorized
accredited representatives, who are not lawyers, to represent aliens in immigration

proceedings. 24 3
However, much like similar state statutes, even when federal statutes and
regulations authorize nonlawyers to perform acts that overlap legal services, there
is usually little or no training, education or licensure required that would provide

239. E.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383-85 (1963) (holding that Florida could not enjoin a nonlawyer from preparing and prosecuting patent applications in Florida when a federal statute
authorized nonlawyers to appear in patent proceedings); United States v. Louisiana,751 F. Supp. 608,
614 (E.D. La. 1990) (holding that district courts are granted broad discretion to determine to resolve
who would be permitted to appear before it and how appearances would be conducted).
240. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (permitting federal agencies to determine whether nonlawyers may
appear in administrative proceedings in a representative capacity).
241. 11 U.S.C. § 1 10. The Bankruptcy Code defines a "bankruptcy petition preparer" as "a person,
other than an attorney for the debtor or an employee of such attorney under the direct supervision
of such attorney, who prepares for compensation a document for filing." 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(1) (emphasis added).
242. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 601.502 (2009) (permitting certain nonlawyers to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service), 5 U.S.C. §500(c) (authorizing certified public accountants
to represent persons in proceedings before the Internal Revenue Service); 49 C.FR. §§ 511.71-511.73
(2009) (permitting nonlawyers to represent parties before the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration); 37 C.F.R. §11.7 (setting out requirements to practice before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office, which does not include being licensed as an attorney for patent prosecutions);
37 C.F.R. § ll (defining "practitioner" before the United States Patent and Trademark Office to include nonlawyers who meet other qualifications); see also Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383-85
(1963) (holding that Florida could not enjoin a nonlawyer from preparing and prosecuting patent applications in Florida when a federal statute authorized nonlawyers to appear in patent proceedings);
Quinitin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their
Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 795, 811 (2003) (discussing federal agencies permitting laymen

to appear in a representative capacity).
243. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 and §1292.2; see also Who Can Represent Aliens in Immigration
Proceedings, U.S. Dept. of Justice Fact Sheet, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/
rarosterfiles/WhoCanRepresentAliensFactSheetl0022009.pdf.
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some measure of quality control and protection for consumers. 2 " For example, for
a nonlawyer to be an accredited representative in immigration proceedings, the
person must be of "good moral character," and on his or her application "set forth
the nature and extent of the proposed representative's experience and knowledge of
immigration and naturalization law and procedure," however, there are no articulated minimum standards. 245 The lack of minimum standards regarding training,
education, and experience raises questions about the competency of accredited
representatives and whether this option adequately protects consumers.
For instance, recently the Board of Immigration Appeal barred Father Vitaglione, a New York priest who was a nonlawyer accredited representative, from appearing in court.24 6 Father Vitaglione had 761 immigration cases in June 2010-more
than the Legal Aid Society's entire immigration unit in New York.2 47 He never
turned down a case and did not charge any fees because, as he said "We have more
lawyers than we have fire hydrants in this city and no one will help." 248 But the volume of his case load caused him to miss appearances and deadlines, and the quality
of the legal work sometimes jeopardized cases. 24 9 He was filling an enormous need
in the system that is not being met by lawyers, but the outcome suggests there still
needs to be adequate protection regarding the quality of services that nonlawyers
provide to the public in such important proceedings.
4. UnregulatedMarket Development
of Nonlawyer Activities
While statutes and rules authorize some nonlawyer assistance, nationwide
that authorization is rare. Furthermore, the assistance authorized is usually limited to aiding in the preparation of documents; the nonlawyers may not give legal
advice. Additionally, the legal profession's efforts to increase access to justice
have not created widespread access to legal services. It was predictable, therefore,
that consumers' growing demand for legal services would create an opportunity
for profiteers of nonlawyer assistance to enter the marketplace. Commercial doit-yourself document preparation services, for instance, have become widespread
and demand for them is high. 250 These services began in the 1960s and 1970s with

244. One notable exception is patent agents who are required to take the patent bar and demonstrate that he or she "[p]ossesses the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him
or her to render applicants valuable service." 37 C.F.R. § 11.7.
245. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.2.
246. See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, Removal of Priest's Cases Exposes Deep Holes in Immigration
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011) (discussing a nonlawyer priest who had more immigration clients
in New York that the Legal Aid Society's entire immigration unit, but who was recently barred from
continuing to handle immigration cases for failing to appear or appearing unprepared to hearings in
221 cases).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, AN ANALYSIS
OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 5 (November 2009), available at
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"do-it-yourself' books and have evolved with today's technology to include a wide
array of "do-it-yourself' software programs and web sites.251 These services have
also been afforded a fair amount of first amendment protection, particularly to the
extent that they are merely providing information about the law. 25 2
Overall, these services are occurring in an unregulated manner, which does
little to provide the consumer protection that the legal profession deems so
important. 253 But they have also fueled significant debates about what constitutes
the practice of law, such as, when is a computer program providing legal advice?25
These questions are resolved, for the most part, through lawsuits filed by lawyers and bar associations 255 that seek to have the courts define these services as

http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose-white-paper.pdf ("Despite facing allegations of unauthorized practice of law, one online document preparation company reports
serving over one million customers since operations began in 2001.").
251. Steve French, When Public Policies Collide. . . . Legal "Self-Help" Software and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 94 (2001) (stating that
legal self-help books and do-it-yourself kits are the "logical predecessors of today's legal software).
The former president of the Illinois State Bar Association lamented the flight of consumers from
traditional legal services when he wrote, "Where would our nation be if its citizens became so disenchanted with our legal system that they abandoned it? If that notion seems absurd, consider the
continued growth in the unauthorized practice of law, which his largely unchallenged by anybody but
the ISBA [Illinois State Bar Association] and IRELA [Illinois Real Estate Lawyers Association]."
Robert K. Downs, Rebuilding our Credibility by Restoring Professionalism,93 ILL. B.J. 496, 496
(Oct. 2005).
252. See Derek Denkla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practiceof Law: An Overview of
the Legal and Ethical Parameter,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2581, 2591-2 (1999).
253. Lawyers' discussions about the unauthorized practice of law take note of potential harm
to consumers. See, e.g., Ole Bly Pace III, Preparingto Meet the Future,93 ILL. B.J. 224, 224 (May
2005) ("The unauthorized practice of law is a real danger to the citizens of our state."); King v. First
Capital Fin. Serv. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1162 (Ill. 2005) ("The State requires minimum levels of
education, training, and character before granting a license to practice law. The purpose of doing so
is to protect the public from potential injury resulting from laypersons performing acts that require
the training, knowledge, and responsibility of a licensed attorney.") However, lawyers must also acknowledge that they also have a property interest in their law license, which is greater when there is
less competition. Richard F. Mallen & Assoc. Ltd. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74, 76
(Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that Illinois lawyers and law firms have standing to file a cause of action seeking to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law because of their property interest in their law
license, which is a valuable interest entitled to protection).
254. See French,supra note 251, at 101 (explaining that the questions regarding what type of
services self-help and do-it-yourself kits actually provide (i.e. whether or not they are providing legal
services) have become the basis for vigorous discussion). Interactive software has presented the legal
profession with a complex variety of issues that threaten to dissolve traditional notions of the practice
of law. Cynthia L. Fountaine, When is a Computer a Lawyer: InteractiveLegal Software, Unauthorized Practiceof Law, and the FirstAmendment, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 147, 150 (2002). Whether or not
interactive legal software is deemed to be the practice of law depends on what definition is being used
to define the practice of law. Id. at 150-158.
255. Most state bar organizations and their unauthorized practice committees enjoy significant enforcement rights. Professor Deborah Rhode surveyed 55 jurisdictions and only 9% imposed
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the unauthorized practice of law and enjoin them from operating. 25 6 It is rare for
consumers to claim they have been injured by the unauthorized practice of law and
to file these lawsuits. Similarly, these lawsuits are rarely brought by state agencies, such as consumer protection agencies.25 8

any external checks on the process. Deborah Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 14
(1981). In a vast majority of states, bar committees are the only agencies that are actively involved in
policing unauthorized practice. Id. at 19. Many courts to do not monitor bar committee priorities or
procedures. Id. at 56. Fifty-three percent of the surveyed jurisdictions stated that the bar has the sole
authority in initiating any type of proceedings against a UPL violator. Id. at 17. Most unauthorized
practice controversy centers on activities involving form preparation and related advice. Reported
cases involving lay practitioners and the majority of committee enforcement is focused on the areas
of real estate (22%), divorce (14%), trusts (11%), incorporation (6%), and probate (5%). In general,
UPL concerns a vast amount of common commercial activity. Id. at 30.
256. See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Lineguard, Inc., 935 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 2010); Richard
F. Mallen & Assoc. Ltd. v. Myinjuryclaim.com Corp., 769 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding
that Illinois lawyers and law firms have standing to file a cause of action seeking to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers of America, District 12,
219 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1966) (Illinois State Bar Association filed suit seeking to restrain defendant from
alleged unauthorized practice of law); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 87 N.E.2d 773
(Ill. 1949) (Illinois State Bar Association filed suit against realtor and alleged that he was engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 88 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949)
(The Chicago Bar Association sued defendant to restrain him from the alleged unauthorized practice
of law); see also Susan Hoppdock, Enforcing Unauthorized PracticeLaw Prohibitions:The Emergence of the Private Cause ofAction and its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 719, 734 (2001) (discussing how Illinois allows attorneys to sue those who violate UPL statutes
on the grounds that licensed attorneys have standing because their rights are infringed upon by UPL
violators); Helen W. Gunnarson, Law Pulse, 89 ILL. B.J. 564 (Nov. 2001) (detailing the Illinois State
Bar Association's litigation efforts to curb the unauthorized practice of law).
257. Deborah Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1981) Only 39% of jurisdictions
surveyed reported any direct customer complaints and out of the 1188 inquiries, investigations and complaints reported by bar agencies, only 2% were a form of customer complaint about a specific customer
injury. Id. at 33. Of the jurisdictions surveyed, 47% responded that the public is skeptical of the bar's
capacity for self-regulation or are suspicious of the bar's self-interest in UPL. Id. at 40. Also, 26% of the
jurisdictions responding stated that the public desired access to laypersons. Id. Jurisdictions including
Alabama, Washington, West Virginia, Arkansas, Texas and the District of Columbia recognize the ability of a consumer (the aggrieved party) to sue UPL violators. Susan Hoppdock, Enforcing Unauthorized
PracticeLaw Prohibitions:The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on Effective
Enforcement, 20 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 719, 734 (2001); see also Illinois Attorney Act 705 ILCS 205/1
et seq. (PA 94-659) (amended in 2007 to allow a private cause of action for consumers seeking damages for the unauthorized practice of law); Thomas D. Zilavy & Andrew J. Chevrez, The Unauthorized
Practiceof Law: Court Tells Profession, Show Us the Harm, 78 Wis. LAw. 8 (Oct. 2005) (discussing
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's denial of the State Bar's petition to provide a clear definition of the
unauthorized practice of law because the Bar did not provide any evidence that that a problem exists).
258. Professor Rhode makes the argument that UPL enforcement should be given to
"less partisan" groups such as consumer protection agencies. Deborah Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
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When the scope of the legal profession's monopoly is largely determined on a
case-by-case basis, public participation in the debate is severely constrained. The
debate is primarily between the parties to the litigation and perhaps amicus curie.
Furthermore, when the litigation results in settlement between private parties, as it
frequently does, the court may not even make a determination about whether or not
the defendant's conduct was the unauthorized practice of law. 259
Issues relating to access to legal services and consumer protection should be
debated in a forum that allows all interested parties to participate in the debate.
While it is likely that there is more than one reason for the difference in the range
of options consumers have for health care services versus legal services, this article posits that a key reason is the availability of a democratic forum to assess
options in the health care field-the legislature-and the lack of a similar forum
in the field of legal services. The legislative experience of the health care profession provides some guidance to the legal profession, which has not been subject
to the external pressures of a democratic process that could force reexamination
of the boundaries of the legal profession's monopoly. 260 As one commentator said
regarding medicine: "In the final analysis, the professions' privileges have to be

Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62 (1981). However, the Illinois State Bar Association has noted
little interest by state agencies to prosecute the unauthorized practice of law. Robert K. Downs, If Not
Now, When?, 94 ILL. B.J. 8, 8 (Jan. 2006) ("We've done a pretty good job at fighting the unauthorized practice of law, but litigation is expensive and proceeds on a case-by-case basis. Overwhelmed,
underfunded, and sometimes disinterested state and local authorities are unable to make UPL a priority.") In contrast, the state of Montana in a Supreme Court Rule dated April 20, 2010 dissolved
the UPL commission and directed all complaints concerning unauthorized practice of law to the
Montana Office of Consumer Protection. See State Bar of Montana, http://www.montanabar.org/
displaycommon.cfm?an=1 &subarticlenbr--195 (last visited March 8, 2011).
259. For example, the Illinois State Bar Association sued We The People USA, a document
preparation service, and alleged that it was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The parties
settled their dispute by a consent decree that defines what acts that We The People may perform.
Accord reached in UPL case of We the People,http://webarchives.isba.org/association/sept07bn/ Accord.htm (last visited February 26, 2011); see also Joseph G. Bisceglia, Midterm Report, 96 ILL.
B. J. 64, 64-65 (Feb. 2008); Deborah Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1981).
Out of the jurisdictions surveyed, 93% allowed the bar to reach informal agreements terminating any
unauthorized practice of law, 84% of bar associations may issue cautionary or cease and desist letters, 76% of bar associations may issue informal opinion in response to UPL inquiries. 72% of bar
committees may issue warning letters, 76% may negotiate agreements, and 68% may issue informal
opinions on their own initiative. Id.
260. It would not be the first time the legal profession took some guidance from the medical
profession. In 1942 the president of the ABA complimented the AMA on some of its legislative activities and said that their experience was an "invaluable aid" to the ABA. The ABA president said,
"It always seems an anachronism to me, but nevertheless it was true, that here were the lawyers who
would be expected to be the pioneers in a legislative group like this taking their lessons from their
brother professionals the medics on how to do the job that the lawyers themselves ought to know how
to do." FISHBEIN, supra note 99, at 471.
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deserved and frequently renewed. None are eternal." 2 6 1 The same applies to the
legal profession.
IV. How to Apply the Public Participation Lesson
to the Field of Legal Services.
A key lesson that the legal profession can learn from the health care profession is that more inclusive participation in debates about the scope of professional
monopolies helps promote innovation in the delivery of services. As one writer
stated:
[G]overnmental action will be intelligent and appropriate only to the degree that the problem has been thrashed out all along the lines and particularly in the major interest groups involved. The study of government
must not only assess the representativeness of group pressures but also
the method and quality of group thinking. 262
This idea is not foreign to the legal profession. As Judge Hand wrote about the
First Amendment, "right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." 263
Currently there is not an adequate multitude of tongues regarding the delivery
of legal services. As many scholars have asserted, there is little room for public
participation regarding the regulation of legal services. 26 There is no place for all
of the major interest groups to debate. There is no effective way to assess the quality of group thinking among lawyers. Lawyers have been far too insulated from
external pressure and ideas.
Another lesson that the legal profession can learn from the health care profession is that other types of licensed professionals can help increase access to services while protecting consumers. This article does not suggest that the statutory
authorization of different health care professionals is a panacea to the health care
access problems that plague our society. 265 The solutions are far more complex,
particularly in light of other dynamics, such as the role of private health insurance.

261. CHAPMAN, supra note 99, at 147.
262. GARCEAU, supra note 106, at 4.
263. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (J. Brennan quoting Judge
Learned Hand); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 19
(1977) (discussing the need for fresh ideas from many sources in order to initiate change in federal
rule-making procedures).
264. See supra note 7.
265. Although there is evidence to support their role in increasing access to health care. Cf.
Benjamin G. Druss et al., Trends in Careby Nonphysician Clinicians in the United States, 348 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 130 (2003) (examining trends in outpatient care between 1987 and 1997 when the
passage of legislation increased the scope and number of nonphysician clinicians, which resulted in
an increase of the population who saw a nonphysician clinician from 30.6% to 36.1%); Edward S.
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However, it is an important tool to help provide affordable access to healthcare
while also protecting consumers through education, training and licensing requirements for practitioners.
For example, in 2011 the Institute of Medicine put out a report titled "The
Future of Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health." 2 66 The committee that
prepared the report was asked to assess what role nursing can assume "to address
the increasing demand for safe, high-quality, and effective health care services."2 6 7
The report concluded that, "[e]vidence suggests that access to quality care can be
greatly expanded by increasing the use of RNs and APRNs in primary, chronic, and
transitional care." 268 The report recognized that fully utilizing nurses will require
continued changes to laws and regulations that limit their scope of practice and
that, in many respects, a continued transformation of the nursing profession will
be necessary to bring to fruition all the benefits it may provide.2 69 The legislatures,
of course, provide the forum for the consideration and enactment of these changes.
Just like a surgeon is not required for every medical problem, perhaps a licensed attorney with a three-year J.D. is not necessary for every legal problem.2 70
Lawmakers have actively sought ways to increase affordable access to health care
and one important tool has been to expand the role of nurses to provide some of the
services traditionally provided by doctors. Lawmakers do not have similar tools
regarding the delivery of legal services.
The most compelling argument for the judicial branches' exclusive power
to define the scope of practice for lawyers is that the lawyers are integral to the
operation of the judicial branch, which is an independent branch of government.
In order to maintain their independence, courts have rationalized that they need
exclusive control over the licensed professionals who appear in its institutions.2 7 1
This is the rationale that courts have used in their decisional law since the early
1900s to assert their exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of lawyers, including

Sekscenski et al., State PracticeEnvironments and the Supply of PhysicianAssistants,Nurse Practitioners, and Certified Nurse-Midwives, 331 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1266 (1994) (analyzing the increase
in the number of physician assistants, nurse practitioners and certified nurse-midwives in states with
favorable practice environments for those professions and noting their ability to increase access to primary care); Tine Hansen-Turton, et al., Nurse Practitionersin PrimaryCare, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 1235
(2010) (discussing the role of nurse practitioners in increasing accessibility to primary health care).
266. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, "THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING
HEALTH" (2011).
267. Id. at xi.
268. Id. at 27.
269. Id. at 5, 28-30, 278.
270. Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How Much the Marketfor Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 997-98 (2000) (discussing the unified nature of the legal
profession including the same training for all lawyers who then enter the marketplace where competition for services is dominated by corporate wealth over individual wealth).
271. See Rigertas, supra note 110, at 89-90.
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defining their scope of practice. 27 2 However, even in light of this position, it does
not necessarily follow that the courts' jurisdiction over the scope of practice for
lawyers means that the public should not have a voice in the debate.
Because of the differences between the health care and legal professionsnamely the separation of powers doctrine-using the legislative forum may not be
a practical place to assess the stratification of the legal profession. However, the
fundamental premise that a robust debate with many voices is the best way to lead
to innovation can still be addressed within the unique context of the separation of
powers problem. It is unlikely that one approach will work in every jurisdiction
given the differences in the state constitutions, rulemaking powers, case precedent
and political environments.2 73 Thus, using the example of creating a license for
housing advocates who could provide legal services in certain areas, several possible approaches for a more democratic assessment of the stratification of the legal
profession-and their pros and cons-will be discussed. Some of these approaches
are currently available, but they each have significant limitations. A couple of other
approaches that do not currently exist will also be proposed as possible reforms.
A. Judicial Rulemaking
One approach that the housing advocacy group could use today is to propose
a rule to the state supreme court to create licensed housing advocates. Both Washington and Arizona's Supreme Courts have used their rulemaking powers to authorize nonlawyers to provide some limited legal services, although the authorized
activities do not include providing legal advice.2 74 There are a couple of advantages
to judicial rulemaking. First, it allows the courts to retain control over the scope of
the regulation of legal services, which resolves any separation of powers concerns.
Second, it allows the judicial branch to be in a leadership position regarding access
to justice, which is a fitting role.
Judicial rulemaking, however, is not a particularly democratic or transparent
process.2 75 For example, in Illinois anyone may propose a rule, including a mem-

272. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
273. See ABA COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAwRELATED SITUATIONs: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONs 4 (1995) ("[E]ach state has a unique
culture, a specific legal history, a distinct record of experience with nonlawyer activity and a current
economic, political and social environment which will affect its approach to varied forms of nonlawyer activity.").
274. Supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Politics of Legal Ethics: Case Study of a Rule Change, 53
ARIz. L. REV. 425, 432-34, 444-46 (2011) (describing a recent rule change in Texas and the process
used, which was dominated by lawyers); Benjamin Hoorn Barton, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts,Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA.
L. REV. 1167, 1188 (2003) (discussing the unique vulnerability that state supreme courts have to lobbying by lawyers). For a state-by-state summary ofjudicial rulemaking, see DONNA J. PUGH, ET AL.,
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A COMPENDIUM (1984); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT
RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 6-8 (1977) (comparing federal rule-making to the legislative process
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ber of the public, but that does not mean that the public will necessarily have an
opportunity to weigh in on the proposed rule. Proposed rules are submitted to the
Supreme Court Rules Committee ("Rules Committee"), which is made up of individuals the Supreme Court appoints.27 6 All of the individuals on the Rules Com
mittee are lawyers.2 7 7 The Rules Committee will then review the proposed rule for
merit, or if the rule is within the scope of another Supreme Court Committee, it
will forward it to that committee for review. 27 8 A proposed rule will not be set for
public hearing unless the committee reviewing it finds that it has merit and recommends it for consideration. 2 79
If a proposed rule is not recommended and does not go to a public hearing, the
Rules Committee includes it in its annual report to the Supreme Court, which is to
be made part of the public record. 28 0 However, obtaining a copy of the Rules Committee's annual report to see failed proposals is not particularly easy. They are not
posted on the Illinois Supreme Court's web site, but they are available in three-ring
binders in Springfield, Illinois. 281
Thus, while the public can propose rules and participate in public hearings
after rules are found to merit consideration, attorneys control the gateway to determining whether a rule warrants consideration. Perhaps this fact does not raise significant concerns when the rules relate to issues that are greatly informed by legal
expertise, such as procedural rules. But this does raise concerns when the issue is
the public's access to the legal system. Judicial rulemaking does not adequately
address the need for broader public participation in the debate. Reform is needed
to achieve this goal.

and describing limits on public participation in the rule-making process). Judge Weinstein described
his experience on the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, in part, as follows:
Our proposed rules on privileges would have and an impact on a variety of groups such as
doctors and newsmen, and yet there was only one occasion when outsiders addressed the
group. It was a rather unsatisfactory session; two doctors appeared and there was a sense
of annoyance at this interjection of outside persons into the committee's deliberations.
Id. at 10.
276. IL. S. CT. R. 3(b). See also http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/rules/Process.asp
for a flowchart of the rulemaking process.
277. The Illinois Supreme Court's web site only lists the following as members of the Rules
Committee: "John B. Simon, Chair; Professor Keith H. Beyler, SIU School of Law, Reporter; Justice Thomas L. Kilbride, liaison officer." http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/Committees.
asp#rules. The Court's annual report, however, provides a full list of the committee members, all of
whom are lawyers, although the most recent annual report available on-line is for 2009. http://www.
state.il.us/court/supremecourt/AnnualReport/2009/AdminSumm/2009_Committees.pdf.
278. IL. S. CT. R. 3(d).
279. Id.
280. IL. S. CT. R. 3(b) and (d).
281. This is based on my research assistant's research and telephone conversation with the
Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court. A former librarian of the Supreme Court used to post them on
his personal blog, but since he stopped working there no one has taken over this task.
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There are ways that the rulemaking process could be reformed to create a
forum for a more democratic debate about delivery of legal services. One approach
would be for the state supreme courts to set up special standing committees focused
on access to justice and to appoint a broad spectrum of members to that committee to assess, among other approaches, the stratification of the legal profession.
Proposed rules regarding access to justice could be proposed directly to this committee. The state supreme court could make sure that the legal profession did not
comprise the majority of the committee members; therefore, determining whether
a rule merited a public hearing would not be determined solely by the legal profession. This would keep the regulation of the legal profession in the judicial branch,
which resolves the separation of powers problem, but create a more democratic
process to assess innovation in the delivery of legal services.
The Illinois Supreme Court has used this approach in a more limited fashion, which demonstrates that such an approach is within its power. In April
2011, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court announced the formation of a
special committee to study and formulate proposals to help improve the judicial process for mortgage foreclosures. 28 2 Notably, the committee consists of
fourteen people "who have been on the front lines in dealing with the housing
crisis," including "judges, bankers, lawyers, a law professor and an official from
the Illinois Attorney General's office." 283 Noting that many consumers cannot
afford to hire a lawyer, the Supreme Court charged the committee, in part, with
providing uniform protocols throughout the state to deal with the explosion of
foreclosures.284
The court could have been more expansive in addressing the problem. The
court could have included representatives from consumer advocate and housing
advocate groups in the committee. The court could have also asked this broad committee to explore ways to increase legal representation for persons in foreclosure
proceedings, including the possibility of training and licensing nonlawyer housing advocates to assist consumers in their foreclosure proceedings. The committee
could have had public hearings on this topic and proposed rules and regulations
to license foreclosure advocates. This approach would have allowed for broader
participation and an assessment of more innovative options.
Another approach would be for the state supreme court and the legislature to
set up a joint commission or task force on the stratification of the legal profession
and for both to pass parallel legislation/rules. This would provide the forum for an
inclusive debate and eliminate the separation of powers question. Kentucky used

282. April 11, 2011, Press Release, Illinois Supreme Court Forms Special Committee to Ensure Fairness and Held Families Cope with Financial and Emotional Burdens in Foreclosure Proceedings, availableat http://www.state.il.us/court/media/PressRel/2011/041111 .pdf.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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this approach when it adopted its rules of evidence in the 1990s.285 The legislature
and the Kentucky Supreme Court engaged in a joint effort to draft evidence rules
and then those rules were simultaneously passed by the legislature and adopted
by the court.28 6 This eliminated any battle over who had the constitutional authority to enact evidentiary rules.287 It also necessarily allowed for a more inclusive
debate.
Another avenue for this approach may be to utilize access to justice commissions to assess expanded delivery of legal services. The state supreme courts of
about half the states have mandated the creation of access to justice commissions
over the past decade. 288 The mission of these commissions is generally to expand
access to justice in civil legal matters. These commissions may be a logical place
for courts to encourage the proposal of rules that would increase access to justice.
While some commissions also have members of the legislature, 28 9 overall they appear to be dominated by the legal profession. 29 0
Membership of commissions would need to be examined to ensure that they
are not dominated by the legal profession if they are going to explore intruding on
the scope of the profession's monopoly. Also, the funding of these commissions
would be an important consideration in ensuring democratic participation. For example, the Access to Justice Commission in the District of Columbia is privately
funded predominantly by area law firms. 29 1 Lastly, the scope of such commissions may need to be redefined if they were to be used as a vehicle for innovative
thinking because their mandates tend to encourage thinking within the traditional

285. Jeffrey A. Parness, Survey of Illinois Law: The Ins and Outs of the New Illinois Evidence
Rules, 35 S. ILL. U. L. J. 689, 692-694 (2011).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. For a state-by-state survey that identifies states with access to justice commissions, see
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCEss ACROss AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT 30-132 (October 7, 2011).
289. Wisconsin Access to Justice Commission website http://wisatj.org/about/ (board members include members from the legislature).
290. See, e.g., District of Columbia Access to Justice Commission website http://www.
dcaccesstojustice.org/about.html (listing commissioners who appear to all be attorneys and judges);
Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission website http://www.massaccesstojustice.org/ (listing
commissioners who all but a couple appear to be attorneys and judges). The ABA's Definition of
Access to Justice Commissions does not emphasize broad public participation. Instead it defines
membership as "leaders representing, at a minimum, the state courts, the organized bar and legal aid
providers. Its membership may also include representatives of law schools, legal aid funders, the legislature, the executive branch, and federal and tribal courts, as well as stakeholders from outside the
legal and government communities." http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal-aid indigent-defendants/1s_sclaidatj-definition of a commission.authcheckdam.pdf.
291. District of Columbia Access to Justice Commission website http://www.dcaccesstojustice.
org/about.html.
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parameters of increasing access, such as increasing funding for legal aid, increasing
pro bono representation and increasing self-help resources for pro se litigants. 29 2
Reforming the rulemaking process to allow for more public participation
regarding the stratification of the legal profession and access to justice would
be the easiest way to address separation of powers concerns. The regulation of
the legal profession would remain in the judicial branch. A major limitation of
this approach, however, is that it requires the judicial branch to take the initiative to create a forum for such a public debate and to give other stakeholders a
voice in the process. The Courts have not historically been open to challenges
from outsiders regarding the scope of the legal profession's monopoly. In fact,
in 1995 the ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice issued a report that recommended:
[Each] jurisdiction's highest court should appoint a body of lawyers and
nonlawyers to make an initial assessment of whether or not certain nonlawyer activity should be regulated. This is particularly desirable when the
nonlawyer activity is closely related to the judicial process. The most difficult and controversial aspects of the assessment will likely concern whether
to regulate legal technicians who provide legal advice to self-represented
persons or who appear on behalf of clients in judicial proceedings. 293
It has been over a decade since the Commission made this recommendation
and there is little indication that the highest courts have pursued this recommendation. However, it would be fitting for the courts to take such a leadership role
in light of access to justice problems and the courts' interest in promoting access
to legal representation. The courts should also have some self-interest in having
trained practitioners to assist people appearing in court.2 94 Lastly, if the judicial
branch does not take a leadership role regarding alternative ways to delivery legal
services, it risks losing control over the debate altogether.

B. State Constitutional Amendments
As was done in Arizona, an advocate such as a housing advocacy group could
gain a voice in the debate today by proposing an amendment to the state's constitution that requires the state supreme court or legislature to create and oversee a
system to license and regulate a new tier of licensed professionals, such as housing

292. See, e.g., Joseph L. Chairez, Lawyers Helping Develop an Action Plan for Justice, 49
5, 5 (August 2007); Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, Mobilizing Judges,
Lawyers, and Communities: State Access to Justice Commissions, 47 JUDGE'S JOURNAL 33, 34 (SumORANGE COUNTY LAWYER

mer 2008).

293. ABA COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER
A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 136 (1995).
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294. Barton, supra note 44, at 458-61 (discussing how courts benefit from the availability of
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advocates. 295 By amending the state constitution-the source of the separation of
powers doctrine-the limitations posed by that doctrine are resolved.
A proposed constitutional amendment does advance the goal of broader societal participation in a debate about the scope of practice for lawyers. In the course
of proposing constitutional amendments, depending on the state and the procedures
used, there may be an opportunity for interested parties to debate in the state legislature, to appeal to the public through the media and advertisements, and to otherwise lobby their state legislatures and the public to advocate for their positions.
There are, however, some limitations and concerns. Constitutional amendments can be a fairly onerous way to experiment with solutions. Professor Charles
Wolfram explained that constitutional amendments require, "coalition building, a
political war chest, diligent effort, the right political climate including sympathetic
handling by a mercurial and largely ill-informed media."2 96 And, accordingly, they
can be difficult to change if they do not work or need to be revised.
Constitutional amendments could also be a difficult way to create a wholly
new profession. For example, the Arizona constitutional amendment, which authorizes some preparation of legal documents by real estate agents and brokers,
does not contain any licensing or training requirements for real estate brokers.
Legislatures, through their police powers, had already passed statutes that regulate
and license real estate brokers and agents.2 97 However, suppose an amendment
was passed to create a new limited license for housing advocates. A constitutional
amendment would be an odd place to address the training, education and licensing
required for such new professionals. The most likely solution would be to have the
amendment specifically direct the judicial or legislative branch to undertake this
task. For these reasons, constitutional amendments are a possible approach, but not
the best approach.
Proposed constitutional amendments may, however, put the necessary pressure on a state supreme court to address a problem through its rulemaking powers
due to fear of losing control over the issue. This is how the Washington Supreme
Court was motivated to pass the rule creating Limited Practice Officers. After the

295. A constitutional amendment could also be used more broadly to completely shift the
power to define the practice of law away from the courts and to the legislatures. Charles W. Wolfram,
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the InherentPowers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 1, 19-23 (1989-90) (proposing various approaches to reform lawyers' exclusive regulation
of the legal profession including constitutional amendments and some legislative efforts); Charles
W. Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participationin Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62
MINN. L. REV. 619, 624-25, 641-45 (1978) (examining the "legal and institutional barriers" that prohibit efforts by nonlawyers to reform the legal profession and discussing constitutional amendments
as one possible remedy).
296. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19 (1989-90).
297. See, e.g., 225 ILCS 454, et seq. (the Illinois Real Estate License Act of 2000).
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Washington Supreme Court invalidated legislation that authorized laypersons to
prepare documents incident to real estate closings, the escrow industry began lobbying for the introduction of a constitutional amendment to exempt them from the
unauthorized practice of law rule.2 98 The escrow industry allowed the bill to die
based on assurances that the matter was being addressed, which resulted in the
Washington Supreme Court creating Limited Practice Officers.2 99 Thus, even if the
public does not pass a constitutional amendment, some support for one may incite
the judiciary to act instead of losing control.
C. Legislation
As with the health care field, a housing advocacy group could try to introduce
a bill into the state legislature that would create licensed housing advocates. The
legislature provides a forum for a multitude of stakeholders to participate in the
debate and challenge the scope of practice restricted to lawyers. 30 Legislatures
are also a logical forum to devise a regulatory scheme for the training, education
and licensing of stratified legal professionals. Also, because the judiciary does not
control legislatures, lawyers would be subject to external influences during the
reevaluation of the scope of its monopoly. These are strong advantages to a legislative forum. As a forum for public participation it is the most attractive option.
There are, however, practical limitations to this approach. The main barrier
to using the legislative process to explore the stratification of the legal profession is the separation of powers doctrine, which generally precludes legislative
involvement in the regulation of the legal profession.3 0' In some states, however,
the history of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary regarding
the regulation of the legal profession may make the legislature a possible forum to
explore the stratification of the legal profession. Some courts have upheld limited
legislative activity by reasoning that the legislature may assist the judicial branch,
although the judicial branch retains the final power to review the "propriety and
reasonableness" of the act.302 However, even in these states, the state supreme

298. David R. Meyer, Court Adopts Rule for Real Estate Closings, THE BAR BULLETIN 21
(Jan. 1983).
299. Id.
300. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 19-20 (1989-90) (suggesting that legislatures try
to reduce the broad scope of the definition of the unauthorized practice of law as one possible way to
increase public participation in legal reform).
301. Supra Section III.C.
302. See, e.g., Cowern v. Nelson, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (Minn. 1940) (upholding the provisions
of a statute permitting brokers to draw documents incidental to real estate transactions in which they
acted as agents under a theory of comity); State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (Wis. 1928) (reasoning that the court will defer to reasonable legislation, although "this deference is one of comity or
courtesy, rather than an acknowledgement of power."); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567, 576 (La.
Ct. App. 1936) ("Due to the fact that courts are not empowered to enact laws, the jurisprudence has
approved legislation passed in aid of the courts' inherent powers.").
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courts would likely view creating a whole new profession to compete with a segment of the legal profession as legislative overreaching.
Because of the separation of powers jurisprudence in most jurisdictions, exploring the stratification of the legal profession in the legislatures will be challenging if not impossible.303 However, it is an option that should not be completely
disregarded because it is the most attractive option for an inclusive debate on the
stratification of the legal profession. Furthermore, even if a state supreme court
eventually struck down legislation authorizing new types of legal professionals, the
process of enacting the legislation would have created a public forum to explore
new ways to deliver legal services. It is possible that the judiciary would then find
merit in the idea, respond to the public support for the idea, and subsequently adopt
identical or similar ideas through its rulemaking powers.
Lastly, perhaps there are some more creative ways to involve legislatures. For
example, "in 1991 the Minnesota legislature passed a bill requiring the state's supreme court to study the feasibility of licensing independent 'specialized legal assistants.' "305 The court did appoint a committee, but the committee members were
all members of the legal profession-judges, lawyers and traditional paralegals. 30
There were no public hearings and the committee did not recommend the licensing
of independent paralegals.30 ' If a legislature has the power to pass such a bill, perhaps it could mandate public hearings and a more diverse composition of the committee. Thus, the housing advocacy group could lobby the legislature to pass a bill
mandating the state supreme court to study the feasibility of training and licensing
housing advocates to provide legal advice and representation. The bill could also
require that the committee's membership not have a majority of members from the
legal profession and to require public hearings on the topic.
V. Conclusion
Meeting the legal needs of ordinary citizens is a challenge that the legal profession has not been able to solve. The increased demand for legal services coupled with the increased cost of legal services has left a growing number of people

303. The only way to ensure that the state supreme courts could not find a legislative act unconstitutional would be to amend the state constitutions so that the power to define the practice of law
resided in the legislative branches.
304. See, e.g., Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm'n, 619 P.2d 1036,
1041 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that a legislative act authorizing lay representation of employees in administrative hearings dealing with personnel matters was not within the scope of legislative power,
but that the court would adopt the provision because it was in the public interest); see also Charles W.
Wolfram, Barriersto Effective Public Participationin Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 619, 640 (1978).
305. ABA COMMIsSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIvITY IN LAw-RELATED
SITUATIONs: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 70 (1995).
306. Id.
307. Id.
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without any legal assistance. Meanwhile, the rising cost of legal education leaves
many students with large loans that require substantial salaries to repay. And substantial salaries cannot be paid without charging substantial attorneys' fees.
Furthermore, while legal education continues to provide a general legal education, legal practice is increasingly specialized. A three-year one-size-fits-all Juris
Doctorate may not be the best way to meet the future legal needs of the population.
However, the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate the practice of law has created a systemic barrier to a public discourse about other options. Despite this, the
scope of the legal profession's monopoly is being challenged by the private marketplace and by some limited authorization of nonlawyer legal activity, particularly
in administrative proceedings. These areas demonstrate both the need for more
options and the possibility that nonlawyers could be competent providers of some
services. However, there has not been a robust public debate about the stratification
of the legal profession.
As a regulated profession, the legal profession is not subject to the usual
efficiencies of the marketplace; that is one of the effects of having a monopoly.
However, this should not excuse the legal profession from having the scope of its
monopoly reassessed by the public. After all, the privilege of the profession's monopoly largely flows from its responsibility to be public servants. As we can learn
from the medical profession, a public debate is an important component to challenge the scope of a monopoly and to assess whether the current parameters of a
monopoly continue to best serve the public interest. Innovation benefits from more
voices. The legal profession should be at the lead of seeking out such innovation.

